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Abstract 
New ICTs, such as mobile phones and social media, are increasingly being seen as catalysers 
for political engagement, the spark of revolutions, or breaking power relations between political 
elites and the ‘information poor’. They have been centralised in the explanation of the Arab 
Spring and the wave of popular uprisings that occurred from 2010 onwards. It is safe to say that 
new ICTs indeed play a role in how information is spread and how people are mobilised for 
protest. However, the need for a reflection on why these new ICTs have a part in the outcome 
of uprisings within its respective context was often lacking. Moreover, it has often been left 
undiscussed what happens after a revolution or popular uprising. Is there actual social or 
political change, or does it often lead to an illusion or deception? New ICTs can prove to be 
extremely useful in mobilisation, the creation and spread of information and awakening a sense 
of political agency. Nevertheless, a country’s history, and its social, political and economic 
context might prove to be just as important when understanding the complexities of popular 
uprisings and their aftermath. This thesis discusses the case of Burkina Faso, where in the period 
of one year, the population rose up twice to demand change, justice and accountability. In 
October 2014, the Burkinabè massively hit the streets and within a ‘ten day revolution’ they 
ousted Blaise Compaoré who had been in power for 27 years. In September 2015, the Burkinabè 
again hit the streets to condemn a coup d’état that was executed by the former right-hand of 
Blaise Compaoré. Both uprisings were successful, meaning that those protesting achieved their 
short-term goals of ousting Blaise Compaoré and stopping a coup d’état. However, the question 
remains if they ensured change on the long-term and why new ICTs played a role in these 
successes. This thesis draws upon six months of extensive fieldwork in Burkina Faso and 
months of employing digital ethnographies, to understand if, why and how new ICTs played a 
role in the growth, outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings. It argues that new ICTs 
played a major role in both uprisings because it brought together a collective of like-minded 
people and it ensured rapid mobilisation. However, we should be careful in putting them at the 
forefront of the explanation of political unrest and uprisings, because the socio-political context, 
historical background, existing political tensions and social structures may affect its effects. 
 
Key words: Burkina Faso; new ICTs; information; uprising; political agency; hybrid social 
movements; political memory; connective action; revolution; mobilisation  
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Introduction: « Le pays des hommes intègres » 
September 2015 
June 29 2015, 22.32 hours: A Facebook posts alerts the Ouagalais that there are shots being 
fired around Kosyam in Ouaga 2000.1 Kosyam is the presidential palace in Burkina Faso’s 
capital city Ouagadougou and it has seen its fair share of guns, attempted military coups and 
angry people over the past decades. Some Facebook posts and phone-calls later confirmed 
that shots had indeed been fired, and that it was the doing of some members of the Régiment 
de Sécurité Présidentielle (RSP). The RSP is the 1.300 man strong presidential guard that 
former president Blaise Compaoré put in place after he had overthrown and allegedly killed 
his former comrade Thomas Sankara in a military coup in 1987. In the night of June 29, the 
RSP attempted to stir up the transition government that had taken over after the Burkinabè 
ousted Compaoré from power after 27 years on October 31, 2014. Luckily, (or unfortunately, 
depending on who is asked), the RSP failed to commission the coup that night. 
  On July 2, 2015, ‘Basic Soul’, a member of the Balai Citoyen,2 a prominent Facebook 
user and an important source of information for many, posted on Facebook that “we” (in the 
broadest sense of the word – “du monde entier” he used) had to be weary of General Gilbert 
Diendéré and his RSP. Diendéré had been involved in politics for over 30 years, and served 
alongside Blaise Compaoré during his entire period as president. ‘Basic Soul’ stated that in 
those 30 years of power and being in the shadow of Compaoré, Diendéré had learned the 
perfect skills to manipulate politicians, soldiers and journalists, and he suspected him of being 
in the midst of the conspiracy that had led to Thomas Sankara’s death. Next to this he stated 
that the end of Diendéré and his RSP was near, and they would soon be dissolved (coming 
from the public Facebook page of ‘Basic Soul’, June 2015). In the ensuing month of July, 
‘Basic’ kept on informing those who wanted to know (i.e. those who followed him on 
Facebook), about the RSP’s every move and urged people to stay vigilant and be aware of 
“brainwashing of the media” and “misuse of information” to destabilize the process of 
transition towards peaceful elections, scheduled for October 11, 2015. 
  After a while however it became quiet around the failed coup of June and the focus of 
information on Facebook and that of other media shifted to the process of the upcoming 
elections and the adoption of the reform of the electoral code. This reform of the electoral 
                                                          
1 Ouaga 2000 is the richest of Ouagadougou’s neighbourhoods where, among others, many politicians reside. 
2 The Balai Citoyen is a social movement and played a major role in the uprisings in October 2014. Later on I 
will describe in detail who they are and what role they played during the uprisings.   
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code, Article 135, was adapted on April 7th, 2015 and stated that those who were in favour of 
changing Article 373 - which led to major uprisings and the fall of Blaise Compaoré in 
October 2014 - were excluded from the elections. In July, members of seven political parties, 
amongst them the Congrès pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (CDP), Blaise Compaoré’s 
political party, went to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and 
protested against the reform, since it promoted exclusive elections (Hébié, 2015). The court in 
Abuja (Nigeria) ruled in favour of the political parties who filed the case, and decided that the 
law should not be reformed. However, the councils to the government of Burkina Faso, 
headed by Mamadou Savadogo and Guy Herve Kam,4 urged the Court to declare the suit 
inadmissible since no human rights were violated (“Loi portant révision du Code Électoral”, 
2015; Hébié, 2015; Zoure, 2015). In August, when the Constitutional Council5 published the 
list of candidates for the presidency, it became evident that several ex-ministers from 
Compaoré’s era were excluded from the elections. The much discussed reform of the electoral 
law was thus accepted by the Constitutional Council in Ouagadougou. This decision was a 
great victory for, amongst others, the Balai Citoyen and other civil society organisations who 
fought hard for the reform. However, the Council ruling did raise new tensions in the political 
sphere just before the elections, and it was up to the transitional government to lead 
everything peacefully up to that decisive moment. 
  Less than a month later, and a month before the long awaited elections on October 
11th, Diendéré and his followers within the RSP succeeded in what they had attempted to 
achieve on that night in June. They fired shots around Kosyam in the night of September 16th. 
In the morning of September 17th Diendéré took several ministers, the prime minister, and the 
president of the Conseil Nationale de la Transition (CNT) hostage, and officially declared on 
state television that the transition government had stopped operating as per direct, and that the 
Conseil National de la Démocratie (CND) would take over in the process of ensuring 
“inclusive and peaceful elections”. This declaration and take-over of power was immediately 
condemned by the international community (ECOWAS, European Union, United Nations, 
United States, and France). But, more importantly, the Burkinabè,6 again, massively hit the 
                                                          
3 Article 37 of Burkina Faso’s constitution limits the presidential mandate to two rounds of elections. Blaise 
Compaoré wrote out a referendum to change this chapter in the constitution to give himself another shot at the 
presidential elections. I will elaborate on this later on in this thesis.  
4 A university professor, and a lawyer and one of the spokesmen of the Balai Citoyen. 
5 Freely translated from “Conseil Constitutionnelle”. 
6 Burkina in Mooré means honour, Faso in Dioula means (father) land, and bè, is plural for people in Fulfulde. 
The use of three of the main languages in the words ‘Burkina Faso’ symbolises the unity of the country.  
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streets to say ‘no’ to this coup and the disruption of the transitional period. 
  Two times in one year, the Burkinabè found themselves in the streets screaming for 
change. Clearly then, the uprising of the people played a major role in both the fall of Blaise 
Compaoré, as well as in Diendéré’s attempted coup that ended quickly (Hagberg, 2015). This 
period in the history of Burkina Faso is a significant one, not only for the Burkinabè, but it 
also concerns “toute l’Afrique et du monde” (Frère, 2015). As she wrote, not only do the 
events of September 2015 show us the courage of the Burkinabè. They also show a country 
that takes its responsibility in (trying to) create its own destiny, giving lessons of morality and 
autonomy, which they share with other countries in the region and which could have a 
domino effect in the region.7 Next to this, these events displayed the new dynamics in 
contemporary society in Burkina Faso, in which the youth, more than 65% of the population, 
play a major role. 
 
An African Spring? 
Many have dubbed the uprising of October 2014 in Burkina Faso as the “Black Spring” 
(Blair, 2014) or “the hope of an African Spring” (Kuo & Tshabalala, 2015). These references 
to ‘spring’ are inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ or the ‘Jasmine Revolution’; described by 
Rennick (2013) as a revolutionary wave of demonstrations, protests and uprisings in North 
African and the Maghreb that started in Tunisia in December 2010, of which some 
unfortunately ended in civil wars. Stepanova (2011) argues that this wave of protests 
highlighted the role of modern Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) and 
digital social media tools and networks in these protests and within socio-political 
movements. However, as she also states, as much as the Arab Spring might refer to a 
phenomenon of new mass forms of socio-political protest, facilitated by new ways of 
communication - and with that the downfall of several regimes - we can in no way downplay 
the underlying socio-political and socioeconomic factors of these massive uprisings and 
protests. And indeed, Burkinabè themselves told me that seeing the images and videos of the 
uprisings in Tunisia in 2010 on Facebook made them think “we can do this too!” (Field notes, 
May, 2015). However, it would be too easy, and incorrect, to place the path of the Burkinabè 
in the same sphere as the Jasmine Revolution. For not only, as Stepanova (2011) already 
mentioned, the context is very different, it would also be too simple to talk of ICTs and their 
                                                          
7 On October 21, 2015, young people in Congo-Brazzaville took the streets to condemn the new referendum 
(“Congo-Brazzaville: Plusieurs opposants anti-référendum brièvement arrêtés”, 2015). Many Burkinabè showed 
their support for their “frères de la lutte” (their brothers in the same battle) on Facebook.    
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use as the main spark igniting the mobilization needed for the uprising, or as the main driver 
which could account for the levels of participation, feelings of empowerment and belonging 
and the collective political action within the country before, during and after the uprising of 
October 2014. Rennick (2013) argues that during the Arab Spring, new ICTs played at least 
some role in producing the revolutionary moment, it being socio-psychological, 
organisational or both: it depended on the time, the socio-political and socioeconomic context 
of the uprising and the country. 
 Before making bold, generalizing claims about the influence of ICTs on uprisings, it is 
important to establish a definition of ICTs. ICTs are technologies that carry information 
(Gleick, 2011; Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2002). Within ICTs, technologies are usually 
understood as electronic and/or computer-based. However, in my understanding of ICTs, 
technologies are manmade artefacts that carry communication and information. This thus 
includes books, traditional media such as radio and print, images, photo’s, clothing (hence 
also prints on T-shirts), as well as new and social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp and the 
regular mobile phone that feature SMS and call possibilities. New media could be defined as 
media through which interactivity between users and information is dominant, rather than 
sender-to-receiver communication (Lievrouw & Livingstone, 2002). In the case that this study 
makes, we need to focus not only on the existence of ICTs; in addition we need to ask 
ourselves the questions what kind of information these ICTs carry and what role a particular 
combination of both ICTs and the information they carry play in uprisings. Moreover, there is 
a need to clearly state that new media have not (yet) outmatched other means of 
communication, such as radio and face-to-face communication, which are critical for 
mobilization and the spread of information (Gleick, 2011). Moreover, it is important to find 
out why certain people identify with new forms of communication and information flows - 
while others do not (Garrett, Bimber, Gil de Zúñiga, Heinderyckz, Kelly, & Smith, 2012). 
  Next to defining ICTs, it is important to establish an understanding of the difference 
between ‘revolution’ and (popular) ‘uprising’ or insurrection, since these words will regularly 
appear in this thesis. According to Hagberg, Kibora, Outtara and Konkobo (2015), the popular 
word on the streets about the Burkinabè uprising was “la revolution”. However in most 
newspapers and academic work that discuss the events in Burkina the word ‘insurrection 
populaire’ (popular uprising) would be used. Coming from the Latin revolutio which 
translates into ‘a turnaround’, revolution literally means a fundamental and immediate change 
in political power or organizational structures in a relatively short period of time when the 
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population rises up in revolt against current authorities (Tilly, 1995).8 According to Tilly 
(1995) we can differentiate between a coup d’état, a top-down seizure of power, a civil war, a 
revolt and a “great revolution”, in which all structures within society (political, social and 
economic) change. Revolutions are often seen in the light of violent uprisings and sudden 
change. An uprising may take place within a revolution, but it is not synonymous. A popular 
uprising, an insurrection by the people, is an act or instance of rebellion or resistance (which 
may be armed) against civil authorities. According to Max Stirner (1982),9 insurrections 
spring from the discontent of one or multiple people, which makes them rise up and demand 
change, and a revolution may ‘follow’ in its wake as the reestablishment of a new order. 
Following Stirner’s lead, later on in this thesis I will substantiate my position on whether 
Burkina Faso’s uprising led to a revolution indeed. However, throughout the text I will use the 
words uprising, insurrection or revolution simultaneously when describing the periods of 
turmoil in 2014 and 2015. In my own observations and reflections, I will use the words 
insurrection and uprising, whereas when quoting an interviewee the word revolution is more 
likely to pop up.      
 
Burkina Faso’s uprisings – a revolution led by ICTs?  
Reviews of the role of ICTs in the Arab Spring often mention the lack of Internet penetration 
and levels of ‘connectedness’ in these countries, which excludes many people from the access 
to information and the possibility to participate, thereby reducing the uprising to an ‘elite’ 
affair. Yet Stepanova (2011) also notes that ICT networks and their potential to mobilize 
people politically can only succeed when the younger, higher educated population (who have 
most access to ICTs) make up not only a large part of the population, but also of the activists. 
  From a purely demographic viewpoint Burkina Faso fits in: with 66% of the 
population being under the age of 24 and a median age of 17.1, youth makes up the largest 
part of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). Secondly, the requirements 
Stepanova (2011) formulates in terms of ICTs and their use amongst the younger generation 
is applicable too: with around 78 per 100 inhabitants having mobile cellular prescriptions in 
2014 (Worldbank, 2015), one could say that access to ICT-based means of communication 
                                                          
8 In a Marxists sense however, we have not yet reached a full revolution, since a system must be fully 
overthrown and replaced by another. 
9 I am aware that Karl Marx and Max Stirner did not have the same definitions of revolutions and uprisings and 
especially of the role of the individual therein. Nevertheless, their quarrelling on the individual versus the 
collective in uprisings and revolutions makes for an interesting discussion in a thesis that focuses both on the 
individual and the collective in Burkina Faso’s uprisings, but is to lengthy to follow-up on in this one.     
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(and possibly the Internet) is rather evenly spread over the population. And since youth under 
24 makes up two thirds of the population, it can be said the young Burkinabè are massively 
connected through mobile phones. However, one must add immediately that most of these 
mobile devices are not smartphones (yet), even though these numbers are growing every day. 
The growth rate of mobile phone prescriptions was 34% in 2011, and with Airtel and Telmob 
(two of the main providers) investing in 3G, 3.5G and 4G connections through the mobile 
servers, the Burkinabè are far from being excluded from the Internet (Lancaster & Lange, 
2015). Moreover, Burkina Faso is one of the countries with the most dynamic growth in 
‘connectedness’ in 2012-2013 according to the most recent ITU-report (2014). The report also 
shows the rate Burkina Faso households connected to fixed-phone and internet lines, which 
was close to zero, whereas the cellular mobile penetration was 71% of the population, 
highlighting the current (at the time of my field work) dependence on mobile telephony and 
cyber cafés.10 This lack of Internet access is often referred to as the digital divide (Norris, 
2001; Fuchs & Horak, 2008; Fuchs, 2008). However the spread of mobile telecommunication 
seems to outpace the – also - increasing online connectedness throughout the African 
continent. Part of the notion of ‘being connected’ therefore nog longer by definition means 
access to landlines. Sheer lack of data makes it difficult to estimate how many people are 
connected to and use the Internet through their mobile phones. Internet World Stats’ most 
recent report on Burkina Faso (2015) shows that by the end of 2014, 9.4% of the population 
used the Internet (1.779.578 users), and 141.740 of them had a Facebook account (0.8% of the 
population). But then again, estimating the reach and spread of information on and through 
Facebook is difficult to measure as well. Nevertheless against this documented statistical 
background of individual connectedness through the new media11, we can conclude that the 
tumultuous events in Burkina Faso are in some way linked to ICTs and its use and that 
therefore one must expect that ICTs played a role in political mobilisation, through the 
spreading of information in the form of spoken and written words, stills and videos. Yet, in 
order to understand the impact of ICTs in these uprisings we need to look at the broader 
political context. And: can this presence and use explain the trigger that made the Burkinabè 
massively hit the streets and say no to both Blaise Compaoré and Diendéré? 
                                                          
10 Even though there is a shift towards wireless connection through mobile phones, tablets and laptops, many 
people are still dependent on cyber cafés where they are able to download large files or can view (Youtube) 
videos (Nyirenda-Jere & Biru, 2015).   
11 Again, we can include a discussion on how trustworthy statistics are, especially in the African context where 
statistics are often outdated and hard to come by (Jerven, 2014). Unfortunately, this thesis does not offer that 
space. Nevertheless, it is important to share the increasing access to the Internet and the every growing statistics 
that hard to keep up with.  
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  Chiumbu (2015) states that ICTs (in theory) provide greater opportunities for political 
participation and engagement than traditional media do, and that they have the potential to 
open up civic engagement. But these new technologies do not replace other forms of 
communication and networking – neither do they replace traditional modes of civic and 
political participation and political mobilisation through social movements. She talks of 
communicative ecologies with layers that provide opportunities for empowerment. She 
differentiates between the discursive, the technological and the social layers. The discursive 
layer consists of the themes, content or information: mediated and unmediated 
communication. The technological layer consists of the ICTs and other carriers of 
information, whereas the social layer is made up by people’s networks (informal and formal), 
institutions and community. She argues that “our accounts of the relationship between 
citizens, media and political participation should include traditional (or old), new, and 
alternative media in their entirety, including such forms as theatre, music, art, spoken-word 
poetry”, (Chiumbu, 2015, p. 12). Furthermore, she states that Burkina Faso’s uprising in 
October 2014 showcased a people-driven revolution that managed to get people on the streets 
with little reliance on digital technologies. However, that does not mean that these were not 
used, or that they were irrelevant to (at least a part) of the uprisings. Here, the opportunity 
arises to focus on how and why those that are connected use these new technologies, rather 
than focussing on those that are not, or on those that have limited access to ICTs. “Their 
tactics need to be documented”, (Chiumbu, 2015, p. 12).   
  The purpose of this thesis is to understand how and why these new ICTs play a role in 
the growth, outcome and aftermath of uprisings. Moreover, it aims to understand how the 
information they carry may influence political agency of individuals and collectives. This 
implies understanding the role of new ICTs in a context – in this case that of Burkina Faso’s 
recent uprisings – in which social networks are already in place, the economic and political 
system are fragile, and where political tensions are tangible, making ICTs as a place for 
possible political engagement not the only catalyser for political unrest. Not only will this 
analysis give us a deeper insight in contemporary Burkina Faso, but it can also be used as a 
point of reference for the study of uprisings and how and why ICTs can play a role therein. 
This includes the debate of the aftermath of (an) uprising(s). The current academic debate and 
the recent political events in Burkina Faso led me to my main research question:    
RQ:  How and why did new ICTs influence the growth, outcome and aftermath of Burkina 
Faso’s recent uprisings?  
15 
Structure of the thesis 
This research question leads to an analysis of the role of ICTs in political uprisings as well as 
in their aftermath. ICTs were in place already before and remain to function after the uprising, 
thereby potentially offering contributions to change, since they carry information  that people 
can act upon, or through which political agency can take form. Moreover, it sheds light on to 
what extent ICTs relate to other political actors within an uprising, such as social movements 
and their leaders, who may also use ICTs to spread their message. This thesis documents a 
case in which ICTs played a role (at least in some way) in the growth and outcome of a 
political uprising, as well as its aftermath. It argues that we need to take into account political 
agency, collective action, social movements and power structures, whilst looking at the past 
and contemporary socio-political context in order to explain the role ICTs played.     
     This thesis will be structured as follows. First, it will discuss the current academic 
debate on new ICTs and social movements. This chapter connects political agency, social 
movements, communication, information and ICTs to the beginning of Burkina Faso’s 
political revolutionary past and more recent political history. Next, the methodological 
approach and chosen methods are discussed. The ensuing five chapters showcase an analysis 
of how and why new ICTs stand in relation to collective identity, youth, strategic ICT-use, 
and collective mobilization leading to the uprisings of 2014 and 2015. In a concluding chapter 
I discuss the findings in the light of the research question and hypotheses.  
  In the chapter « Nous sommes des enfants de Sankara », the reappearance of Thomas 
Sankara (Keita, 2015), Burkina Faso’s revolutionary leader from the 1980’s, will be 
discussed. In times of public discontent and henceforth also during the uprisings of October 
2014 and September 2015, images, quotes and references to his Pan-Africanist ideas are used 
as a reference to what it means to be Burkinabè. This chapter will reflect upon his legacy, 
memories of the past (politically) the way Sankara and another popular hero, Norbert 
Zongo,12 were ‘revived’ during the uprisings and what it means to be Burkinabè. 13    
  The chapter « Quand la jeunesse se met débout… », will specifically highlight the role 
of the youth in Burkina Faso’s recent history by the use of Honwana (2014)’s concept of 
waithood. Not only do the youth make up a huge chunk of the population, they are also the 
ones who are often more connected and were very prominent in Burkina’s uprisings. Growing 
up with knowing no other leader than Blaise Compaoré, it is striking that many young 
                                                          
12 Norbert Zongo was a critical journalist, who will be discussed later on.    
13 These memories and meaning making of “être Burkinabè” will be taken from the interviews I did in Burkina 
Faso, as well as from the Facebook-pages (images, texts and quotes).   
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Burkinabè are passionate followers of Sankara’s political ideas (or the thought of him as a 
revolutionary leader perhaps). Stories will highlight how ICTs have changed their abilities to 
gain political access, to awaken their political interest or their call to action. Moreover, this 
chapter will put an extra emphasis on the stories of four young women, each revolutionary on 
her own terms.  
 The next chapter, « Notre nombre est notre force », discusses the role of the Balai 
Citoyen in the uprising of October 2014 and September 2015. It will discuss the ‘core’ of the 
Balai, what purpose its spokesmen fulfilled, and how they organised both themselves as well 
as their members. In this chapter I include the discussion on the tensions that rose in Burkina 
Faso long before October 2014. This includes the birth of the new political party, the MPP 
(Mouvement pour le Peuple et le Progrès), the start of the Balai Citoyen and the influence of 
the think-thank CADRE (Cadre de Réflexion et d’Actions Démocratiques) in the discussions 
around the end of Blaise Compaoré’s rule.  
 The chapter called « La lutte continue », discusses the uprising in October 2014, 
which led to the fall of Blaise Compaoré, the uprising after the coup d’état in September 
2015, and the elections of November 29th, 2015. This chapter highlights Rennick’s (2013) 
framework on how we can understand the role of new ICTs in uprisings in two phases.   
 In the ensuing chapter, « Débat politique », I take a close look at the role of Facebook, 
the spread of information and how people used ICTs during the Burkinabè uprisings. I will 
highlight an interview at Radio Oméga about the “online guerrilla-war” against the regime-
Compaoré, which was fed by information on Facebook. This chapter also highlights the 
negative aspects of communicating through new ICTs by discussing the power that politicians 
and electricity companies (often state-owned) have in controlling or trying to control 
information and political debates online. Moreover, it will discuss issues of power, connection 
(the network), and devices (Castells, 2009).  
 In the concluding chapter « Ensemble on n’est jamais seul », I discuss how and why 
new ICTs played a role in the growth, outcome and the aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings, 
and what role political memories, hybrid social movements, connective action, information 
and communication power structures have played therein. This leads us into a discussion on 
the role of ICTs, the aftermath of uprisings and political change. If the goal was structural and 
sustainable socio-political change; did the Burkinabè manage to achieve this? And if so, how 
much has actually changed?  
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New ICTs and social movements: a recipe for change?    
In describing Burkina Faso’s changing social and political reality, an interdisciplinary 
approach to theory and concepts is needed. The role of new ICTs in political engagement, 
social movements and political change has been much discussed in both political 
communication and social movement theory and research. I borrow concepts from these 
approaches, as well as from more sociological, anthropological and political science 
perspectives, in order to understand the process of political change, and/or popular uprisings, 
and in particular the role ICTs play therein. I argue that a discussion of the concepts of 
political agency, political memory, collective action and hybrid social movements and how 
they mutually influence each other is needed to formulate an answer to:   
RQ:  How and why did the existence and use of new ICTs influence the growth, outcome and 
aftermath of Burkina Faso’s recent uprisings?  
 
Dynamics of political agency  
Political agency is one of the central concepts to this research, which implies that we need a 
clear understanding of what I understand as agency in this thesis. Agency is usually 
understood as directed, meaningful, intentional and self-reflective social-action (Chabal, 
2009, p. 7). Political agency can also be understood as political action in everyday life (de 
Bruijn, 2016, p. 101). It stems from the respective importance of structure and individual 
action in social change. Following Bordieu (1977; 1984, in Paracharissi & Easton, 2013; and 
Pérez, 2008), agency and the social structure in which it exists, complement, inform and 
influence each other, leading to constant mutual reshaping of the everyday life. At the 
intersection of the old and the new (i.e. change), individuals and collectives are navigating 
within the shifting structure, while being an agent of that change (Paracharissi & Easton, 
2013, p. 9). They slightly adjust to a new order of reality, and hence change the ‘field’ in 
which they operate as well as their practices. Yet, being able to act is subject to possibilities 
and constraints, making change through agency unpredictable (Bandura, 1986). Ortner (2006, 
p. 165) describes how, in her understanding of agency, the context is the determinant of 
actions, but at the same time the context might be transformed by these actions. The goals that 
drive agency might be based on individual free will, but these goals and the ways of achieving 
them are shaped by (cultural) values, or terms of reference, i.e. the context in which an 
individual operates. In this thesis, (political) agency is understood as (the capability of) 
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political action towards a certain goal. I consider agency to be something that is potentially 
always present. Nevertheless, the awareness of this capability to act is something that 
sometimes needs to be and/or will be triggered by the structure in which agency is (and with 
which it is in interactive connection). I view political agency, both collective and individual, 
as something that is dynamic within and reacts towards its context. 
 Chabal (2014, p. 45) underlines that within the ‘agency in African studies’-debate, the 
debate has shifted from looking at Africa as a ‘victim’ towards focussing on the African 
‘initiative’. Chabal (2009; 2014) urges that the use and understanding of the concept of 
agency while solely focussing on the ‘African’ context can be subject to depriving ‘Africans’ 
of agency because it emphasizes “what they do to survive” rather than on “what they might do 
to achieve the kind of structural and systematic change they actually want”, (Chabal, 2014, p. 
52). But, we should keep in mind that agency is related to the unpredictability of outcomes of 
processes of change (de Bruijn, van Dijk & Gewald, 2007). Rather than focussing on 
surviving and describing ‘agency within the African context’ – which might come across as 
generalizing -, we should focus on the specific circumstances, resources, opportunities and 
contexts in which people act upon their environment, wherever that might be.  
  When discussing agency, we need to elaborate on the issue of being able to choose to 
act. Choice, naturally, is also subject to circumstances. The choice to not-act may also be an 
act, because it still makes it a purposive action directed at the belief in one’s self-reflective 
own action (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Klandermans & van Stekelenburg, 2014). Moreover, 
agency does not stand on its own, but exists within a social world, in which opportunities, 
resources and context influence action and sense of agency. Following Cleaver (2007), agents 
are potentially capable of generating change through purposive acts and routine practices. So, 
individuals may be able to act upon their environment to reach a goal, but how does their 
agency change when they form, for example, a collective to reach a goal? According to 
Bandura (2000), people’s shared beliefs in their collective power to produce desired results 
are a key ingredient of collective agency. Collective action is the exercise of collective agency 
through shared beliefs in the power to produce (wanted) effects. The results are the product of 
shared knowledge and skills of the different members, as well as of the interactive, 
coordinative, and synergistic dynamics of their transactions (Bandura, 2000, p. 76). People’s 
shared beliefs in their collective efficacy influence the types of actions they seek to achieve 
through collective action, how well they use their resources, how much effort they put into 
their actions, how vulnerable they are as a group and as an individual, and their staying in 
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power (or stay trustworthy, accountable, etcetera) when collective efforts fail to produce 
quick results or meet expectations (Bandura, 2000, p. 76). Following Cleaver (2007), we can 
understand agency in collective action as deeply relational, and constituted by routine practice 
as well as purposive action, meaning that the individuals within the collectives are in constant 
dialogue, making decisions both alone and together. Moreover, collective agency is not 
simply the result of the sum of individual members’ beliefs. Collective action is a group of 
people acting on a shared belief, or grievance. Individuals interact with a collective, which 
might result in an emergent property; the formation of a more complex behaviour as a 
collective (Bandura, 2000).  
  Ekman and Amnå, (2012) mention that in order to understand how (political) 
engagement and the collection of ideas and thoughts works within different contexts and 
within different groups, such as women, or the youth, the pre-political orientations, activities 
and ideas of individuals must not be overlooked. They bring a framework in which we can 
understand the choices for and differences in political participation, both individually and 
collectively. They state that for every form of participation there is an individual and a 
collective one. Deliberate non-participation relates to (amongst others) disinterest, frustration, 
social exclusion and actively avoiding political issues and the news. Civil participation can be 
divided into paying attention to social issues, and actually taking action to change. Political 
participation relates to deciding to (re)act within or towards the political sphere, such as 
voting, deliberate acts of non-voting, or becoming a member of a party. This includes the 
decision to not-act politically. Activism relates to either legal or illegal actions against the 
status quo. Both challenge the ruling relations and hierarchies of information, communication 
and politics (Ekman & Amnå, 2012). All of the above mentioned relates to having a choice to 
act, having the freedom to move politically and to make political decisions.  
 Within context of political change, people may act towards a certain goal because 
there are triggered to do so, in which the belief in oneself and in the possibilities to act 
towards a certain goal, are a prerequisite for these actions. Within its context, individual and 
collective agency of people, groups and things might be awakened from hibernation, might be 
triggered by events, or might weaken or nod off again when there is no sense of urgency for 
change, i.e. changing its respective context. Understanding dynamics in political agency is 
crucial within its context. The political context in which individuals and collectives navigate 
and in which they can, for example, choose to act for change, also relates to how individuals 
and collectives might feel oppressed in how their nation is (being) shaped (Calhoun, 2007). 
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He states that, especially, in times of political transition or unrest, the discussion on 
(re)shaping the nation and its identity almost always relates back to history (and political 
heroes). Therefore, in the context of Burkina Faso’s uprisings, I will delve into the concept of 
(collective) political memory that can play a big role in collective action and giving incentive 
to act – i.e. acting politically to reach a certain goal.     
 
Collective memories and collective action 
Memories are important in attaining and maintaining political power and political legitimacy. 
One of the ways in which this can be done is the use of memories of those who and that which 
are to be publicly forgotten or remembered (Igreja, 2013, p. 315). Moreover, (the naming of) 
public institutions such as universities and government buildings, and the use and role of the 
army within society, based on past memories and events, are important instruments in 
building a (selective) collective memory within society, reflecting the views of the political 
elite. It is evident that the views of the (ruling) political elite might not always reflect that of 
the opposition and that of its people. Adebwani (2008) mentions that in post-independence 
Africa, national liberation struggles were often essentialized, whereas problematic memories 
were removed from memory and commemoration, embodying the new political order and 
regime. Notably, in times of political change, memories can be used as weapons (Igreja, 
2008) to gain votes and instigate contestation.  
  Following Misztal (2003), collective memories are seen as intersubjective constituted 
results of shared experience, ideas, knowledges and cultural practices through which people 
construct a relationship to the past. Cultural memories, as defined by Assman and Czaplicka 
(1995, p. 128-129), comprise a body of reusable texts, images and rituals specific to a group 
or society in a certain age and time. The “cultivation” of these memories stabilizes and 
conveys a certain self-image which is used for the creation of collective knowledge. The 
creation of a collective identity within a group based on cultural memories focuses on the 
knowledge from which a group derives awareness, for example to certain political tensions or 
issues. This is reflected in the sense of “Us” versus “Them”. What remains of the past in 
memories is that “which society in each era can reconstruct within its contemporary frame of 
reference” (Assman & Czaplicka, 1995, p. 130). This means that cultural memory is a 
reconstruction related to knowledge of a contemporary situation. Moreover, in order to 
objectify the communicated meaning and collective knowledge, memories need to be settled 
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or formed: both written, oral and through (other forms of) art.14 How a group (a society as a 
whole or groups within society) uses cultural memories in shaping collective identity, or the 
feeling of “belonging to” and collective knowledge varies from time and place. They 
nevertheless can be used for the foundation of identification and/or appropriation of the 
(shaping of) the tendencies within a society. 
  Following Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) I contend that peoples’ understanding of the 
past has strategic and political consequences. Contestation over the past also relates to the 
meaning of the present and the way forward. Contestation and reconciliation are often 
conflicting on the question as to who or what is entitled to speak about and lay bare what 
happened in the past, rather than what actually happened in the past. The need to belong to a 
certain group or telling their truth is often higher than reconciliation, which might result in 
selective memory (Gardner, Pickett & Brewer, 2000). Resolving meaning in the present and 
giving meaning to a cultural memory within a society or community often results in a conflict 
over representation, each claiming ‘their’ truth. Hodgkin and Radstone (2003) stress the same 
importance to the specific context in which memories get their meaning as Assman and 
Czaplicka (1995) do, namely that memories are invoked in schools, museums, art and media 
(both mass and other), meaning that they serve the idea of a nation, a government or a certain 
group within society (Anderson, 2006). They state that memory is thus political: a contested 
site of struggle over meaning. 
  As stated before, in times of political transition the new governments or other groups 
within society try, with the help of (cultural) memories to (re)establish legitimacy, (political) 
inclusion and a sense of (national) unity. Hence, there should also be some kind of shaping or 
reshaping of collective identity in the process of democratisation or political transformation. 
Nationalism of a country begins with the creation of national identity, followed by acts of 
heroism and struggles against oppression, and unites living members of the nation with the 
great cultural accomplishments of its past to which national unity is shaped (Calhoun, 2007, p. 
86). To put it in other words, even the sense of national unity or a collective identity under the 
umbrella of nationalism lives with dominant cultural (and thus always political) memories 
which are used to establish, construct or give meaning (direction) to a national identity. 
Nationalism, as Calhoun (2007) suggests is a subset of claims to identity and autonomy on the 
part of populations that have the size and the capacity to sustain themselves. Calhoun (2007) 
                                                          
14 Hereby I would like to stress that by written and oral I mean “stories” as told in history, whereas art can also 
take the shape of oral and written stories. My point is that communicating memories can be done through written 
and oral histories, but also through paintings, graffiti, music and other forms of art.  
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states that in times of revolution or political change, collectives fall back on their collective 
identity shaped by collective memories. These memories can be brought back to life with the 
use of texts, speeches, events, and institutional communication.  
  Cultural memories can thus be used as tools – or weapons - by politicians, as well as 
by opposing groups within civil society to call for change, adhere to a sense of belonging or to 
call for collective action (Johnston, 2013). In a society in which politicians have reconstructed 
or given meaning to past events which in the eyes of other groups in society happened 
differently, contestation and conflict may arise. In Burkina Faso, contestation happened 
around the deaths of several public figures, for which people demanded justice. This will be 
discussed in the chapters that follow. When a society is in transition and the ruling elite have 
deliberately concealed part of history, memories can again be used to shed light on how 
society can be reshaped, who will be remembered, and where the ‘truth’ lies.    
Moving on: rising tensions and new social movements 
Not only are cultural memories used in the shaping of a national identity by politicians, they 
are also used by social movements to address or create a sense of belonging for their members 
or followers in times of political unrest (Johnston, 2013). In this section I will discuss youth in 
waithood, social movements and how they relate to new ICTs and collective action.   
  The daily challenges of young Africans have, in some ways, led to protest movements 
in which they challenge the status quo, hierarchical politics,15 the lack of basic freedoms and 
social inequalities (Honwana, 2015). Youth are often marginalized, also when it comes to 
politics (Podder, 2015). Younger generations are often excluded from participation and 
decision-making, denying them an active role and obscuring their capacity for action, which 
may result in a sense of powerlessness (Bordonaro & Payne, 2012). Moreover, youth are often 
put in the corner of ‘uninterested’ in politics and apathetic (Honwana, 2015). Yet, this is 
precisely where ICTs might impact most effectively. The Internet contributes to the freedom 
of the younger generation because it “unlocks participation from traditional authority 
structures and information gatekeepers” (Lusoli, 2005, p. 155). Considering that they are 
often not heard, or lost their trust in the political system, this is an important step. Since this 
group is most likely to be online, and consists of highly skilled and intense users of these 
media (Dahlgren, 2004; Dahlgren, 2013; Mossberger, Tolbert & McNeal, 2008), it increases 
the potential for a significant effect of Internet use on political engagement (Boulianne, 2009). 
                                                          
15 During a discussion in Mozambique a journalist called this “old men’s politics that govern a young population 
they don’t understand”. Drawn from field notes from fieldwork in Mozambique in October 2014 by the author.     
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  Within this research, youth is seen as a social construct rather than an age group, 
relating their belonging to attributions such as authority, social position, power, ability, rights, 
(in) dependence, knowledge and responsibilities (Podder, 2015, p. 2). Following Honwana 
(2015), I build upon the argument of ‘waithood’, a prolonged period between childhood and 
adulthood that makes African youth anxious. Many young people cannot afford to form 
families and are unable to become fully independent in a traditional sense (making a home, 
providing for your family, etcetera) because of the lack of jobs and social equality, whereas 
new, or rather modern, forms of adulthood have yet to be established (Honwana, 2015, p.50). 
She states that in their shared marginality within society, they develop a sense of a common 
identity and critical consciousness that leads them to challenge the established order. The 
challenges that young Africans face, both in the political sphere as well as outside, relates to 
the feeling of ‘can do’, which can be a prerequisite for triggering political agency, namely that 
the more you are left out of the conversation, the more it might results in acting politically in 
another way, for example by finding others who share your grievance, or by expressing 
yourself online.  
  Youth in waithood are not the only ones that are often marginalized. Income 
inequality and rising tensions between the rich and the poor might also lead to protest. This 
necessarily challenges the structural violence of the state, which provides, amongst others, full 
voting rights and freedom of speech, leaving the poor and the ‘unheard’ out of direct state 
decision-making (Cross, 2015). Formal channels through which officials communicate are not 
interactive and do not engage. Young revolutionaries, or those in ‘waithood’, challenge a 
regime that they see as “only democratic in appearance, concealing a sophisticated 
dictatorship supported by international economic interests and political alliances”, (Cross, 
2015, p. 4).  I follow Engels (2015) who, in her article on uprisings in Burkina Faso, states 
that there is a relationship between spontaneous insurrections and more organised and 
sustained variants of protests by trade unions and other established oppositional organisations. 
She states that both forms of protest can be understood as interlinked forms of contentious 
political action. Engels (2015) does not shy away from using Marxist terms of class struggle 
when explaining riots and organized protests in Burkina Faso. She claims that a class-based 
analysis of social struggles in Africa should not be narrowed. Rather it should include the 
whole range of poor people, which includes students, employees, small-scale farmers, self-
employed people in the informal sectors, petty traders and the like: ‘the rebellion of the poor’ 
(Engels, 2015, p. 95) . Organizations or social movements that arise and that attract people 
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who share a similar idea or share the same grievances are therefore not necessarily rooted in 
the structures they claim to represent: the overall objective of ‘the poor’ is to overcome 
unequal socio-economic relations and hence to aim for political change.Tall, Pommerolle and 
Cahen (2015) argue that societies which find a division between expectant youngsters and 
elders who rule the status quo, the former can either submit themselves or become 
emancipated through mobilisation, even though this might sometimes be violent. Moreover, 
Badimon (2013) argues that unemployment could also serve as a catalyst for collective action.  
  However, to all of these underlying socio-economic issues, we need to address a new 
player to the field. With new ICTs, social movements reached a new dimension in which 
events such as the Arab Spring are immediately relayed and interpreted (Tall, Pommerolle & 
Cahen, 2015, p. 17). This rapid spread of information and the ‘doings’ of other social 
movements could indicate that movements in different parts of the world learn from each 
other when they feel they are in similar situations. McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) 
explain that mobilizing structures, opportunity structures and framing process are all crucial in 
understanding the emergence, development and outcome of social movement activity. 
Whittier (2002, p. 289) states that “social movements are neither fixed nor narrowly bound in 
space, time, or membership. Instead, they are made up of shifting clusters of organizations, 
networks, communities, and activist individuals, connected by participation in challenges and 
collective identities through which participants define the boundaries and significance of their 
groups”. This focus on networks implies the interaction of groups that demand change in 
confrontation with powerholders. These groups can be multiple, and do not necessarily have 
to be connected to each other. However, social movements are categorized as more than ‘just’ 
ad hoc uncoordinated protest activities, being difficult to predict, in which we need to focus 
on the identity of the whole movement, rather than who is part of it (Diani, 2011; Tilly, 2001; 
Earle, 2011).  
  Notably in Africa, de Waal and Ibreck (2013) argue that social movements often have 
difficulty in sustaining collective action, and that they are either co-opted into political 
systems or mirror the violent logic of the states against which they rise up. They argue for an 
understanding of non-violent political action and everyday forms of resistance that exist 
within societies under oppression. Everyday resistance can take forms such as choosing to 
not-partake in political practices (Ekman & Amna, 2012), or political actions outside of the 
official political system. Social movements in Africa may initially emerge as spontaneous 
uprisings that demand change, whereas overtime they might become alternative patronage 
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systems competing for better positions and limited change within a fundamentally unaltered 
system (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 309). Moreover, their leaders might seek power for 
themselves or align themselves with the politicians they tried to replace. This may, naturally, 
lead to mistrust and feelings of deception among their followers. In all this, new ICTs can 
provide access to an imagined alternative political order and facilitate rapid mobilisation 
(Rennick, 2013; Loader, 2008). However, as de Waal & Ibreck (2013) mention, social 
movements in hybrid political systems – such as in many contemporary African societies as 
they argue - tend to fade as rapidly as they emerge, with their leaders that lack a clear agenda 
or change course into formal politics for their own good. They argue that the voluntary 
idealistic collective action that characterises African social movements tends to be episodic 
because they fail to establish permanent change. Informal, non-violent episodes of protest that 
might turn into social movements might become an integral part of society. De Waal and 
Ibreck (2013, p.309) call these new forms of social movements hybrid.   
  Thigo (2013) argues that new technologies offer a space for self-organization of 
collective action by citizens to transform and engage with power structures. Nevertheless he 
argues that real-world inequalities, such as the educated versus the uneducated, are amplified 
within this space. Because of social media, people with access to these technologies tend to be 
drawn to information and mobilisation very quickly, making mobilisation and collective 
action fast and easy. Bennett and Segerberg (2012) argue that we need to distinguish two 
logics in the understanding of organizational dynamics of social movements. One is the 
familiar logic of collective action which is associated with high levels of organizational 
resources and the formation of collective identities. They argue that with the introduction of 
new ICTs, the core dynamics of these movements does not change. The second logic they 
characterize is that of connective action which is based on personalized content which is 
shared across media networks. The sharing of this content does change the core dynamics of 
social movements in their organizational structure (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). This 
individual orientation of communicating the message results in engagement in politics (online 
and offline) as an expression of personal hope, lifestyle and grievances (Bennett & Segerberg, 
2012, p. 744; Rennick, 2013). The result is that people still join in collective action, however 
their identity reference might be more derived from personal expression of believes rather 
than through a common group ideology. Ideology ceases to be the rallying point and is 
superseded by fluid social networks (Castells, 2000). These networks can operate through the 
organizational processes of social media, for instance setting up online discussions groups, 
26 
mobilizing participation in events, manifestations and the like. Social movements, in the logic 
of connective action, negotiate common interpretations of collective identity linked to 
contentious issues at hand (Benford & Snow 2000; Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Rennick, 
2013; Snow, 2001). In other words: they adjust their collective identity to the context. The 
framing of issues and finding common ground may mobilize individuals, and awaken their 
political agency. However, the formulation of ideologically demanding, socially exclusive or 
high conflict collective frames may also lead to fractures within the movement since the 
movements are not able to bridge differences within the movements. 
  The difficulty with rapidly occurring movements and the urge for change is that 
people often expect almost immediate change, where structural change often takes years, or 
even decades (Honwana, 2015). It therefore seems logical to put the popular uprising of the 
Burkinabè in line of a revolution that was meant to overthrow Blaise Compaoré, after which 
many more luttes (struggles) will follow. Contexts are never neutral: “it remains the case that 
power is defined and appropriated by those who have the ability to wield finances, recognition 
or articulation and therefore inspire protest as a response by the powerless” (Thigo, 2013, p. 
258). Thigo (2013) states those new African social movements who challenge power relations 
in these new (virtual) spaces, and the stories that they are trying to tell, represent the uprising 
of ‘subjugated knowledges’, a set of knowledges that are hidden behind more dominant 
knowledges (Foucault, 1980 p, 82). They are trying to work around the information that the 
status quo is giving them through, for example, state-owned traditional media.  
  Nevertheless, when social movements can easily spread their shared grievances and 
mobilise the marginalized with the help of new ICTs, without tactics and an accompanied 
strategic plan, “it might be a recipe for disaster” (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 317) and can 
lead to a lot of uncertainty. In times of political contestation in which movements organize 
themselves without ideological backgrounds and individuals join these movements based on 
their own ideals for democratic change, it might be likely that those with the strongest 
commitment to the movement might end up feeling lost.   
 
Liking, sharing, spreading: ICTs and information flows 
In the following discussion, the interaction between information, ICTs and political agency 
within power structures in society is put centre stage. In times of rising political tension, ICTs 
and information might play a crucial role in mobilisation and awakening of political agency. 
But, first there is a need to define ‘information’ more precisely. 
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  Information is knowledge or intelligence that you get about something or someone 
(Webster, 2014), but it is subject to social circumstance to the extent to what happens with 
information and to what makes information powerful. Information is meaningful, nevertheless 
we need to define if information is ‘just there’, or if it develops. This relates to the distinction 
of having (access to) information and being informed (Webster, 2014). Gleick (2011) argues 
that information is closely associated with uncertainty, just like agency, change and uprisings 
are also related to uncertainty. Gleick (2011, p. 219) argues that information is characterised 
by uncertainty, surprise, difficulty and entropy, since there is an unlimited possibility of 
messages, there is an unlimited amount of information. Moreover, in a sense, any message, 
word, or other ‘information’ has a probability to exist. Next to this, Gleick (2011) argues that 
information is disorder. The more regularity a message has, the more predictable it is, leading 
to less information in a message: “How random and how much information turns out to be 
one and the same: they have the same answer “(Shannon, 2001 in: Gleick, 2011, p. 329). 
  Gleick (2011) argues that, like the printing press, the telegraph and the telephone 
before, the Internet is transforming the language simply by transmitting information 
differently. What makes cyberspace different from all previous information technologies is its 
intermixing of scales from the largest to the smallest, broadcasting to millions, narrowcasting 
to groups, to instant messaging one-to-one (Gleick, 2011, p. 77). This might lead to 
overwhelming feelings about the amount of information that is accessible, which can in turn 
lead to a perceived gap between information and knowledge, and knowledge and wisdom. 
  Burrell (2014) questions if information is enhanced or even brought into existence by 
the involvement of new technologies. This raises the question if there even is such a thing as 
‘new’ information. Is information new when it has not been heard by those that hear it for the 
first time? Or is every word we write, even if it has been written over and over again, new 
information in its new context? Technologies which could be carriers of information, change 
understanding, thought and meaning in often very indirect ways (Gleick, 2011). Does this 
then also imply that ‘new’ information could be a perquisite for change or the broadening of 
the mind? Or is it the technologies that carry this information that make for new perceptions 
of information that was already there? 
  Bimber (2003) argues that radio and television helped to contribute to an emergence of 
broader audiences. Moreover, new ICTs such as the Internet, mobile phones, smartphones and 
social media networks (all carriers of information) have been suggested to influence political 
agency, political processes and have opened up the possibilities for political change 
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(Boulianne, 2009; Chadwick & Howard, 2009). These studies suggest that new ICTs and their 
capabilities are catalysts (and sometimes enablers) for change in political behaviour. 
  However, following Moores (2000), technology does not have a direct, 
straightforward impact on social change as technological determinists claim, nor does 
technological development inevitably bring social change (McLuhan, 1964). I argue that both 
information and the technologies that carry information are subject to meaning-making 
processes and appropriation of individuals and relevant social groups. So how can we 
understand information and ICTs in relation to political agency and political change? “It is 
down to the people themselves to make the best of technologies”, (Mutsvairo, 2016, p. 3). 
Bucy and Gregson (2001) propose that the online participation of citizens and the 
comprehensive exposure to political messages play a role in defining the dynamics of 
participatory politics. Nevertheless we should be weary to limit our understanding of these 
processes to that accessibility to technologies is a sign of active political participation. 
“Action is what matters”, (Mutsvairo, 2016, p. 7). 
  A limitation to the reach and hence influence of ICTs in societies is that of the digital 
divide: the accessibility to ICTs and thus information (Norris, 2001). Not only does this apply 
to new ICTs such as the Internet and mobile phones, this is the same with having the access to 
a radio, television, or being able to read. Studies have shown that the digital divide correlates 
along the lines of income (Bonfadelli, 2002; Golding & Murdock, 2000; Norris, 2001; Lusoli, 
Ward & Gibson, 2006). A democratic divide can also be identified (Castells, 2007; Fuchs & 
Horak, 2008). Meaning that this divide is not only related to economic and societal divides, 
but also that “people with high income, far-reaching and influential social relationships, good 
education and high skills are much more likely to have access to ICTs, to be capable of using 
ICTs, to benefit from this usage, and to be supported in political participation by ICTs than 
people who are endowed with only a little amount of economic, political, or cultural capital” 
(Fuchs & Horak, 2008, p. 101-102). If this is the case, this confirms Hindman’s (2008) 
conclusion that even though new ICTs give a voice to the people who have felt or were 
voiceless (i.e. not heard), that they might redistribute political influence, and might involve 
citizens more within political processes, there is still an elite rule in who has access to 
information, and maybe more importantly, who creates information. However, new ICTs do 
give the people that do have access the possibility to challenge the information monopoly of 
traditional elites (Hindman, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, there is the commonality among African 
youth that they share an overall hunger for information. The virtual space is public, yet 
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anonymous (de Bruijn, 2016, p.102). Meaning that, while being anonymous, one can express 
oneself online in ‘public’ giving a certain freedom to expression ones opinion. Next to this, 
Thigo (2013) argues that the online space is ‘new’ because popular accessible communication 
technologies have opened up public domains for civil politics where no such space existed 
previously: they are not managed or regulated by the political elites or authorities. A voice of 
an individual or a collective that chooses to break the silence, addresses the status quo or 
exposes the masses to wrong-doings of the ruling elite (of which they might have been 
unaware for some time), increases the likelihood that the information-poor and voiceless can 
feel empowered, after which movements may rise, collective action can form, or they can 
choose to not-act, while being informed.  
  Having access to ICTs and information brings opportunities to challenge existing 
relations in the creation and spread of information. Castells (2009) calls this ‘empowerment 
through mass self-communication’: challenging the existing communication networks. These 
networks of communication exert power over who gets information, and what kind of 
information. This ability of mass self-communication increases the ability to produce new 
messages coming from the audience, instead of from corporate or governmental 
communication networks, which changes power relations in the communication sphere. 
Castells (2009) furthermore states that while corporate communication networks process the 
construction of meaning on which power relies, the state constitutes the default network for 
the proper functioning of all other power networks, giving them the power to coordinate, 
interrupt, and use their monopoly on violence, if defined necessary by those in power. He 
claims that in order to understand power relations in communication networks, the actors, 
interests and values, the construction of meaning of the message, and their relations need to be 
understood (Castells, 2009). This means an understanding of who holds power in a given 
context, and how this power is exercised within a communication network. In other words, 
there are communication networks, which are also collectives that have agency, which 
influence in their areas of interest, and where they construct ideas and meaning around their 
interest. This relates to the idea of “information cocooning” (Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012), 
in which people search for the information that confirms their beliefs. This can become, or is, 
a problem when (political) power exercises this in such a way that the only information 
available is that of one certain belief or perspective – this includes memories of the past. In 
this case, counter power - the deliberate attempt to change power relationships (Castells, 
2009) -, is set up by changing communication networks around alternative views and values, 
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which could eventually lead to social change. 
  By engaging in the cultural production of media, and by developing autonomous 
networks of horizontal communication, people find new abilities to invent new ideas and start 
building “their projects by sharing experience” (Castells, 2009, p. 431). Counter power 
enables people to exercise new ideas within their (new) networks by constructing meaning 
themselves, for instance about past events – such as the death of Sankara. The feeling of 
belonging to a group, as discussed above, also relates to that people feel like they ‘can do’. 
“Pouvoir”, in French both ‘can do’ and ‘power’, can explain both sides of Castells’s (2009) 
idea of power and counter-power. An individual with political agency might not be able to 
express his or her agency, because of fear of those in power when he or she is alone. It could 
indicate that an individual can only express or be aware of their political agency when he or 
she is empowered through a collective. Agency might be experienced only within the 
collective, through expressing or acting out counter-power. 
  With the availability of numerous platforms on which citizens can seek out 
information that confirms their opinion and looking for news that matches their preference, 
there could be an increase of “information cocoons” (Tewksbury & Rittenberg, 2012). But, 
this can also lead to a critical mind, and seeking information that is not given by traditional 
media, “especially for those who before had been information-poor” (Bimber, 2001, p.57).  
Numerous scholars have pointed to new ICTs as being an important new resource for the 
successful organization and implementation of social movements (Della Porta & Mosca, 
2005; Langman, 2005; O’Lear, 1999; Wasserman, 2007). New ICTs have been used 
especially in organizing and implementing collective activities, promoting a sense of 
community and collective identity among marginalized group members, creating less-
confined political spaces, establishing connections with other social movements, and 
publicizing causes to gain support from the global community (Eltantawy & Wiest, 2011).  
  For social movements, especially in places where connecting infrastructure is limited, 
mobile phones  do not only transmit (political) information, but they also transgress cultural 
and social borders, and hierarchies, in the way that they refashion identities and create 
economic, social and communicative networks (Eltanwawy & Wiest. 2011; Della Porta & 
Mosca, 2005; Wasserman, 2011). However, the role of ICTs and social movements in 
aftermaths of uprisings and social change has often been left undiscussed. In understanding 
how and why the existence of (new) ICTs influences the growth, outcome and aftermath of 
uprisings, the case study of the Burkinabè uprisings in 2014 and 2015 will be presented. 
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Hypotheses 
The above discussion on new ICTs and social movements and the role they play in uprisings 
leads to some gaps in literature on the outcome and aftermath of uprisings. Moreover, there 
often is one-dimensional understanding on the effects of new ICTs on, for example, political 
participation. By describing Burkina Faso’s case, this thesis aims to analyse the role of new 
ICTs in the growth, outcome and aftermath of political uprisings by looking at political 
agency, collective action and political change, while taking into account the past and 
contemporary socio-political context. Therefore, on the basis of the theory and concepts as 
discussed above, I draw up several hypotheses that will address these issues.  
 
H1: Dynamics in political agency can explain why new ICTs played a role in the growth, 
outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings.   
 
H2: The use of memories of past political heroes in the collective actions frames of 
movements, shared both online and offline, played a role in the growth, outcome and 
aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings.  
 
H3: The logic of connective action in the understanding of the social movements that 
challenge power relations through, amongst others, new (virtual) spaces, explains why new 
ICTs played a role in the growth, outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings. 
 
H4: Existing power structures in communication play a role in how new ICTs were used and 
how they played a role in the growth, outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings.     
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Methodological approach and research methods 
In order to understand how and why ICTs have influenced the growth, outcome and the 
aftermath of the uprisings in Burkina Faso, there is a need to understand ICTs within their 
context. This includes an understanding of how this context affects dynamics in political 
agency. De Bruijn, van Dijk and Gewald (2007, p. 2) mention that our methodological ‘tools’ 
to research the processes and dynamics in societies in which actors and structures negotiate 
meaning and space are probably not developed enough. Since there is no straight answer to 
the complex social reality that I am describing, and moreover, I am describing my 
interpretation on the course of events, this thesis takes an interpretive and reflexive approach. 
This means that I derive meaning and interpretations from words, sentences, opinions, 
feelings, and in this case study, the political context that give them their particular content and 
meaning. Moreover, this study will pay attention to other written and/or made artefacts that 
carry information (songs, Facebook posts, poems, clothing and other forms of art) which are 
not usually meant when thought of ICTs. These form the environment from which I and 
others derive meaning, and in which I did my research.   
   
Research design  
An interpretive approach implies that subjectivity and objectivity are linked and that reality is 
somewhat ‘knowable’ but always subject to human interpretation, including my own (Della 
Porta & Keating, 2008, p. 23). Interpretive reflexivity considers social positions within 
ongoing circuits of communication between researcher and researched (Lichterman, 2015). 
Moreover, it aims at understanding subjective knowledge within its context. Since human 
beings are meaningful actors, we must aim at discovering the meanings that motivate their 
actions rather than relying on universal laws external to the actors. We therefore rely on the 
perceptions of individuals and their subjective meaning making as ‘their truth’ (Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008, p. 24). It is research in progress, interlinked with feedback. Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (2009) argue that reflexive research is characterised by recognising that all data are 
the results of interpretation and systematic reflection on the implications of interpretations at 
several levels. Throughout this thesis, and in the process of researching and writing down, I 
attempt to understand where my understanding for the context comes from, while arguing that 
the knowledge and truths I aim to understand are rooted in the meaning-making process of the 
actors within their own contexts. This thesis focuses on the positions of those that are 
(politically) acting for change outside of the power structure of the ruling regime (Hussey, 
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2012; Smith, 1990). It focuses on their everyday lives, the social relations in which their lives 
are embedded and the ideologies and discourses that they share and contest. But: I have to add 
myself to this equation. I was engaging with the actors and I made them part of my research. I 
brought another context with me, which includes another discourse, language, and way of 
viewing the world. In order to grasp Burkina Faso’s changing social reality, a triangulation of 
ethnographic fieldwork data seems a logical choice, since “what ethnographic data shows, if it 
shows anything, is life in action: behaviour changing; people in the process of becoming; 
groups in the process of formation and transformation”, (Katz, 2001, p. 71), it thus lays bare 
the dynamics of agency. The way in which I came to understand the role of ICTs and the 
dynamics in agency was by employing “a hybrid blend of investigative journalism and field 
ethnography” (Ross, 2013, p. 8). Deploying a triangulation of ethnographies that are rooted in 
social movement studies and anthropology, result in qualitative methods such as interviews, 
digital ethnographies, participating and observing. But first, there is a need to set the stage.   
   
Political context in which this research took place 
Research started well before my fieldwork period, which lasted from March 28th to August 
1st, 2015. At the end of October 2014, the Burkinabè massively hit the streets to oust their 
president from power. I have been following the news on Burkina Faso ever since. I am aware 
however that news is never neutral. The news stations and people I followed on Facebook 
were very involved in the revolution of October 2014, which makes their news about the 
uprisings that they published heavily biased on the side of the population that rose up. 
Nevertheless, I also followed French and other international news stations about the 
revolution in 2014, which made for an interesting case of: ‘revolution’ versus ‘uprising of an 
angry population against its longstanding president’ – news articles.   
  After the ousting of the president on October 31st, 2014, a period of political transition 
followed. The transitional government consisted of people from the army, judges, civil society 
activists, trade unionists and the like. Since this transition was the temporary conclusion of a 
tense and hectic time, political discussions were everywhere. People talked politics in the taxi, 
on the market, in the streets and in the maquis.16 It therefore was relatively easy to set up a 
network of people who were willing to talk to me about my research subjects: the uprising, 
                                                          
16 In Burkina Faso, the maquis are little cafés alongside the roads and in the quartiers and can be found 
everywhere. You can have breakfast, lunch and dinner and a drink after (or during) work. In many occasions the 
maquis turn into a bar / nightclub after dark. Maquis are generally a social meeting-place for friends and 
colleagues to hang out and discuss (politics too!). Even though women are allowed to join, it is often still the 
men that occupy most of the seats, while the women are serving the food and drinks (Hilgers, 2006). 
34 
ICTs and political change. One might say that because people were eager to talk about those 
subjects there was no lack of stories. However, the excitement prompted by the ousting of 
president Compaoré, this enthusiasm may in some cases have led to an overly positive view 
on the events in October. Whichever way, it was a fruitful and interesting climate to do 
research in. Just after I left Burkina in August 2015, a coup d’état was attempted, which 
resulted in the second uprising discussed in this thesis. I, like many others, had a déjà vu when 
it came to how the Burkinabè again hit the streets to speak up against their self-proclaimed 
leaders. Therefore, I will also touch upon the differences and similarities between these two 
uprisings within ten months in the analysis.  
 
Mutual understanding 
Coming to Burkina, I only had one contact and a phone number. This meant that I had to 
build a network from scratch. My cultural knowledge of Burkina Faso was not extensive. This 
gave me an open and fresh mind to take everything in; however it also meant that I might 
have been unaware of culturally defined approaches, sensitivities and undisclosed practices. 
Especially in the beginning of my fieldwork, I often just went along in order to learn as much 
as I could. As soon as I learned more about where I wanted to go as a researcher, I 
simultaneously felt more confident of my place within Burkinabè society. Throughout my 
fieldwork period (and after that too), I was highly aware of how different I look, and being 
aware, I could use my appearance to my advantage (although I know it also poses many 
disadvantages such as never ‘fitting in’ or being ‘invisible’). The fact that I am a young 
woman, blonde, European and my French was not up to perfection leads me to think that 
many people might have seen me as unthreatening, ‘sweet’ maybe, and somewhat naïve. 
Because of my earlier fieldwork experience in Mozambique, I knew that my appearance, as 
well as me being a foreign student could give me information and access to people that other 
(local) researchers or journalists for example might not have had. A journalist in Burkina even 
said to me once: “How did you get to meet that person? I’ve tried for over two years!” (Field 
note, May 27th, 2015). However, I am also aware that because of this, as well as my – 
certainly in the beginning – limited knowledge of Burkina Faso’s complexities hindered my 
understanding of some of the interviews as well as my ability to get to the bottom of what I 
actually wanted to know.  
  Next to this, for both myself as for almost all of my informants and interviewees, 
French is spoken as a second or third language. Often, when I entered a group of friends, a 
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room full of people, or a meeting between officials, the first question I got was if I was 
French. I’m not sure, nor will I ever be, if people easily led me into their conversation, 
because they thought I would not quite follow the conversation anyhow, since my French is 
not perfect, or that they often dislike the French – whichever way, I think that being Dutch 
and speaking (enough) French, gave me some opportunities that other people would not have 
had. However, a big side note to this is that I might have missed some addressed meanings by 
others which I could not pick up.    
  Moreover, the fact that I do not speak Dioula, Mooré or another language that is 
prominent in Burkina Faso, excluded me from some conversations. I am aware that because 
of this I might have missed out a lot of (political) talk and discussion. However, most of the 
conversations we had were in French because many of the groups of people that I was with 
consisted of different ethnicities, and different languages. French was, also for them, a way to 
include everybody in the conversation. Lastly, the fact that the people who I was with spoke 
French indicates that they have at least enjoyed some education, and it excluded people that 
did not speak French from my research. However, since my research was mostly based among 
higher educated, politically active people in bigger cities and online (French writing) this can 
easily be explained. It is not my intention to generalize about the people of Burkina Faso and I 
am aware that I exclude many people due to my own linguistic limitations. This handicap 
however is not a fundamental restriction to any claims about ICTs and the use thereof of 
people with access. This being said, an overview of the research methods will follow.   
 
Interviewing 
My principal method of research was deploying semi-structured interviews with journalists, 
political activists, professors and students, political figures, and artists. The interviewees were 
found by means of snowballing. I had one contact at Université de Ouagadougou, a professor 
in Communication, through whom I began setting up my network. After our first conversation 
on the political context in which Burkina Faso was at the time and who played major roles in 
the public debates, he gave me names, phone numbers and Facebook addresses. My 
interviews were almost always semi-structured because I had questions prepared. 
Nevertheless, I was open to issues that might pop up during the conversation, or for issues 
that they would want to discuss (Bryman, 2008, p. 438). After each interview I would ask 
questions such as: “who do you think will be suitable to answer questions concerning the 
uprisings, political participation and (social) media use”? I can never be sure that I spoke to 
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the right people. However, in this way I kept getting directions to other individuals who are 
active within social movements, or to others who were engaged, such as journalists.   
  In the beginning I chose to speak with everybody that would answer my calls or 
WhatsApp-messages to create a kind of overview of what was going on in the country. I 
noticed that it was relatively easy to get a number or an email address, but meeting in person 
was sometimes more difficult. This might be because people would not see the benefit for 
themselves to join in an interview or simply because of time constraints. I found that I had to 
let go of setting rigid times, or expecting that someone would definitely show up or that it 
would always go as I thought it would. I had to be flexible as to the topics discussed as well, 
the places and times where the interviews would be held, and ensure that both the interviewee 
and I would feel comfortable. Since many of my interviewees were people who moved around 
in several types of networks, it would sometimes (if time allowed) prove valuable to meet 
with them in their different contexts to get a better understanding of who they are (Bryman, 
2008, p. 417). 
  After a couple of interviews, and probably a month into my stay in Ouagadougou, I 
had a better sense of where I wanted to go with my research. This was also based on the 
development of my own line of thought as put down in field notes and my diary. I actively 
started approaching people of whom I had heard a lot, whose name others would have 
mentioned often, or those that I already had spotted through social media. At that time I also 
felt more confident in knowing what I wanted, which made it easier for me to approach 
people too. I now had a story that I wanted to write! A story of ICTs that, in some way, 
manifested themselves as part (or in the centre?) of public discontent and an uprising.  I 
therefore started to approach people who were active in the social movements, young 
students, journalists, and social entrepreneurs. Many of my interviewees turned out to be 
people in rather privileged positions, because they are able to study, have jobs, or have a 
position within the government. Nevertheless, my interviewees were quite diverse in their 
(political) opinions, positions and actions. Moreover, the informal talks and the long 
conversations that I had with young activists, self-employed entrepreneurs, people who joined 
the movements during the uprisings, etcetera, proved to be just as valuable. They showed me 
what people ‘on the streets’ were doing, and how they thought about political issues, the 
uprisings and their place within society. 
  All eighteen interviews were recorded with the consent of the interviewee. Moreover, 
all information stated within the interview is treated anonymously, unless the interviewee 
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would gave me his or her consent to use names, professions or other demographic 
information. People only agreed talking to me on record when they were open in discussing 
the political issues. None of the interviewees refused to answer a question and all of them at 
least seemed to speak freely. In any case, the interviews were, although about a topic of my 
choosing, open and natural conversations in which we could exchange ideas and information. 
Most interviews lasted around an hour, although some lasted as long as four hours. 
  I often noticed that engagement in the conversation through the sharing of 
observations or a personal experience led to a fuller understanding of the meaning that 
someone ascribed to the discussed topic (van der Geest, 1998). Moreover, when something 
was unclear, I would always ask if they could elaborate or give an example (Bryman, 2008, p. 
556-557). Evidently, I would pick up new information from an interview which I would after 
include in conversations thereafter. The accumulation of such new insights also certainly led 
to a more comprehensive understanding of what many different people thought about a certain 
topics. 
  Of course things some people said would contradict what I had heard previously from 
people in other networks about the same issue. People would share their side of the story, and 
their communication towards me – being the researcher – would be intentional. Thus 
understanding the context of my interviewees and from which point of view their stories were 
told, was crucial in interpreting the conversations I have had with them. In my field notes I 
would therefore always write down their contexts as well as of the interview itself, where and 
when, as well as whom the interviewees were in relation to my research.  
 
Participating, travelling, and observing    
Since the main objective of this research was to understand how individual and collective 
political agency arises, joining (participating) in the daily (political) life of Burkinabè was one 
of the main research methods I used. Drawing from my earlier experience in Mozambique, I 
knew that getting access to highly placed politicians was nearly impossible without a network. 
But then again, so was meeting with the ‘right’ people to get access into the movements that I 
wanted to study. Going into the field, I was relying on ‘getting data’ from interviews. 
However, after three weeks (and in the months thereafter) it became evident that much of my 
understanding of the country and what was going on in the time of political transition was 
based upon small talk, long evenings with new friends, walking around in the city of 
Ouagadougou, and by travelling the country (de Bruijn & Brinkman, 2012). Moreover, the 
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majority of my field notes and observations stem from small talk with practically anybody 
who would be willing to talk to me (Driessen & Jansen, 2013). This included taxi drivers, 
women on the market, people in the bus, and people who came up to me, asking curiously 
what I was doing in Burkina Faso. Sometimes, I would enter a conversation with a question 
such as: “What do you think about politics?” Often, people would dismiss it, and say that 
politics did not mean anything to them, and that it belonged to the big men “that messed 
everything up” (Field notes, March and April, 2015). The next thing was that they would 
normally chat on for another ten to twenty minutes (depending on how long our drive was) 
about politics.  
  By using travelling as a method to understand the context in which Burkinabè go 
about their daily lives one understands differences between ethnic groups, languages, 
religions, and regions better. But, more importantly, I came to an understanding of what 
connects people and how they stay connected. I got to know their routes, their mobility and 
their connectivity (de Bruijn & Brinkman, 2012). I have travelled with two of my informants 
to their family homes, which gave a deeper understanding of where they come from, but also 
how they stay connected with their families (often through mobile phones). Moreover, by 
seeing the country, you see how connected it really is.. 
  Much of my fieldwork was based on luck, the words of Sarsby (1984, p. 96, in 
Bryman, 2008, p. 401): “initial luck in meeting good informants, being in the right place at 
the right time and striking the right note in relationships”. Rivoal and Salazar (2013) speak of 
serendipity as ‘the art of making an unsought finding’. Maybe the fact that I was not fully 
aware (especially in the beginning) that I was ‘being a researcher’ permanently made me 
approachable and left my eyes open to all sorts of information. In either case, during my 
fieldwork I could never fully be a participant, nor fully an observer. Because of the way I look 
- a young, blonde woman - I stand out in Burkina Faso. Moreover, my own background and 
how I introduced myself in groups and when I met new people, as a research student from the 
Netherlands, I would have never been able to fully be one of them. In the context of my 
research I would therefore describe myself as an observing participant (Bryman, 2008). I 
observed the context and its people. Observations generate questions, and occasionally an 
observation or conversation seems to contradict what I thought I knew which lead to new 
questions and possible new insights. We can never fully participate in that which interests us 
most, because we are always an outsider (van der Geest, 1998). Given this, I would argue that 
I did participate within everyday life, in which I also made observations; however, I was 
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always the one creating most of the setting – being it in an interview, over dinner, or while 
travelling. However, getting close with people and becoming friends, at times unintentionally, 
gives information about their context and lives. I would say that the moments of hanging out 
as friends often taught me more than the official interviews I’d had with them before.   
 
Digital ethnography: social media as a tool for data collection and staying connected 
The importance of including the online ‘habitat’ of people and a group of people is something 
that cannot be overlooked in this research, since people’s online habitat is a part of their 
natural habitat (Hallett & Barber, 2014). A digital ethnography of course includes digital 
spaces in the understanding of social interactions and networks, as well as online spaces 
where issues are played out as well, or where they might even take form. Since online and 
offline lives overlap, understanding both discourses is crucial in this research. Murthy (2008) 
argues for a balanced combination of physical and digital ethnographies that enables 
researchers to de-marginalise the voice of respondents. Notwithstanding that, as I discussed 
earlier, access to new ICTs remains inaccessible for many within Burkinabè society.   
  The digital ethnography within my research had two time phases. Before my fieldwork 
I acted as a covert observer (Bryman, 2008; Murthy, 2008), by observing discussions and 
interactions within big and active Facebook groups of which you could easily become a 
member. Based on news articles and search engines within Facebook, in which I typed in 
words such as: “Politique” or “Burkinabès”, I would come across open Facebook groups in 
which political, social and economic issues were discussed. In the months before my 
fieldwork period, these groups would mainly focussed on the referendum that Blaise 
Compaoré set out for the change of Article 37, the (potential) resignation of Blaise Compaoré, 
reform and change. Within these groups some people and organisations stood out, and on the 
basis of number of likes and interaction on their posts, I started following those people and 
organisations more closely. At this stage, all groups and people that I followed were open and 
did not have ‘closed’ accounts. This gave me the option to follow the discussions and the 
posts of the people ‘under cover’. I could remain (relatively) anonymous, because I would not 
engage in any discussion with my personal profile. After coming to Burkina and speaking 
with people, I would ask informants and friends which groups they followed, and which 
groups they recommended. Of course, I also became Facebook-friends with many people I 
met, through which my online network, once ‘within’ Burkina Faso, grew too. By doing so, 
and with my presence in the country, my role as participant observer became more visible. 
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However, since Facebook is such an open space, I could still move around relatively covert.   
 The posts that are used for the analysis in this thesis were selected based on their 
relevance of my understanding of the context. I am highly aware that in this perspective, I 
thus created the story I want to tell about what was going on online, as well as how I interpret 
what is important for the story. A selection was made based on the three most active 
Facebook groups and their most active posters in it. Based on conversations I’ve had with 
Burkinabè offline, they would indicate who important opinion leaders in the Facebook groups 
were. This is hence also highly subjective to whom any of my conversation partners would 
think of as opinion leaders. However, I argue that because of the goal and the scope of this 
thesis – understanding how and why new ICTs played a role within its given time frame – a 
general understanding of the public discourse in these Facebook groups was more important 
than having a complete overview of the discussions.        
  Next to this, Facebook proved to be an extremely valuable tool for staying in touch 
with informants (many of whom became friends), for reaching out to people (even when in 
the field), for collecting multimedia material, and for understanding the structure of 
relationships online within the groups studied (Murthy, 2008). Even though studying 
Facebook groups and interactions therein proved to be very useful, I am aware of the ethical 
fact that people did not know I was researching what was happening online. However, I argue 
that any ethical objections are countered by the fact that everyone that I followed online 
already had a fully open profile and chose to publish (personal) opinions online themselves. 
When I used quotes or screenshots of postings on Facebook of a person’s profile, I have 
always asked for consent. Lastly, I am aware of the digital divide that exists online also, 
which means that Facebook groups do not give a representative image of society. However, 
when combining it with physical ethnographic research, we come to a more comprehensive 
and relevant understanding of what is going on, both on- and offline.   
 
Reflection on interpretations  
I would like to underline that the networks in which I operated in the field, and those in which 
I didn’t, have shaped both my research and personal experiences tremendously. Towards the 
end of my fieldwork, I found myself being friends with many who were part of the Balai 
Citoyen, journalists, or self-employed entrepreneurs who joined the street rallies frequently. 
Most of my friends and interviewees were men. I did not necessarily want this to happen, and 
I did search for female activists, journalists and politicians to interview. I managed to 
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interview some; however, the realm of politics in Burkina is still overcrowded with men. 
However, those women that I interviewed and became friends with were more than willing to 
talk to me and share their story.  
  As mentioned before, much of my fieldwork was based on initial luck in meeting the 
right people, and being able to create relationships with those people. I profoundly remember 
one time in which luck was in place, an incident which paved at least a bit of my way into the 
Balai Citoyen. I had an interview with N at her work. After, she invited me for lunch with her 
colleagues. She introduced me to everyone, and one of them asked: “So, what exactly are you 
researching?” to which I answered: “Social media, young people and politics, or something 
like that” (it was in a time that I was still rather confused about my focus). He sort of smiled 
at me as an answer, but he said nothing. After that encounter I felt a bit awkward and dumb… 
Maybe I had said something stupid? After lunch I prepared to leave, when he came up to me 
and said: “I coordinate all social media for the Balai Citoyen, would you like to come to a 
meeting next week?”  
  Often I came across people, rallies or places where I was not for the sake of ‘finding 
data’, but which later proved to be extremely valuable in my understanding. Songs of 
slammers during a normal night out, conversations with friends in the middle of the night, and 
meetings in which I found myself of which I had had no previous notice that they would take 
place. I found things, moments and people that I was not even looking for. These accidental 
findings are amongst the great treasures of my fieldwork. I can be said that my fieldwork was 
in many ways going with the flow. I followed the flow of my own thoughts and scribbles, the 
flow of information, and the flow of the country and its people in a period of political 
transition. Understanding the dynamics can be done by watching events as they happen and 
following them as they develop, as Klandermans & Staggenborg (2002) mention, following 
dynamics and cycles is crucial in understanding and predicting further collective action.  
  At that time there was so much going on in Burkina that it was hard to keep up. There 
were concerts, movie nights, festivals, demonstrations, discussions and rallies almost every 
week, and I wanted to be a part of everything. This also means that I sometimes got a bit lost 
to where I was going and where this flow would take me. I just went where the action was. 
Going with the flow put me in certain networks of people who also went with this flow. 
Becoming friends with some of the people from the Balai Citoyen and other movements, 
meant that I gained an insight in how they interact with each other also, rather than just 
hearing them speak at a rally. However, this also implied that getting into other networks – 
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such as that of political parties or opposing movements – proved difficult. It was never my 
intention to be part of one movement, something which I avoided. Even though I spent more 
time with people from the Balai Citoyen then with other politically active movements, I was 
always discrete, and independent. Thus I would never wear their T-shirts or rally with them. I 
never shared information to other interviews or conversations when it was evident (and/or 
stated clearly) that this information was supposed to stay internal. 
  Because of insufficient time to build a huge network, and because of the fact that I had 
to start focussing at a certain moment in time, there are definitely some movements, parties 
and people that I did not talk to. One of them, for example, is M21, a movement that was 
sometimes very prominent in interviews and news articles during the period of transition. 
However, I never came across someone who could give me a phone number or name of 
someone that I could speak to within that movement. Moreover, getting close to prominent 
politicians within the transition government was also something that proved more difficult 
because I did not have the right people in my network that could link me to people within the 
government. Many politically relevant events must have taken place behind closed doors. I 
am therefore very much aware that there are sides to every story that I have not heard: my 
blind spots (Gordon, 2007). This awareness prompts me to clearly state that no story told here 
is the truth.  
  One of the prominent networks of which I was a part of was a group of friends who 
were all members of the Balai Citoyen, one of the most prominent social movements. They 
were active during both uprisings and very visible as a political actor during the period of 
transition. I wanted to get to know the people in this network, as well as understand their 
structures, way of working and organizing. They let me in – as much as they wanted too – and 
let me be a part of their meetings, evening dinners with friends, and drinks late at night. Being 
with the Balai Citoyen gave me a good insight in, especially, the younger “cibals”, as they 
call themselves, and what motivated them to join a politically active social movement. They 
were as diverse in education, work and ethnicity as you can imagine, making it a very 
interesting group of people to be a part of. They formed a collective based upon their political 
beliefs and urge for social change, which brought them together. Even though it was not my 
intention to do so, I cannot deny that being in their presence has influenced at least some of 
my own line of thought about politics, especially because most of our conversations in the 
course of four months were about politics, political systems, and: anarchy. At the end of my 
fieldwork period they were convinced that they had turned me into a fellow anarchist. A huge 
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part of their informal conversations consisted of fooling around, something that the Burkinabè 
like to do a lot in general. It took a while for me to get used to the nuances in jokes and them 
being serious, so misunderstanding and misinterpretation of their jokes from my part was 
something they loved to make fun of.  
  The second group of people that I spent a lot of time with was a mixed group of 
Burkinabè, French, Swiss, Nigerien, Dutch, Malian and others. They were a bizarre mix of 
self-employed entrepreneurs, dancers, artists, painters, students and expat-workers. The fact 
that this group was so highly mobile and changed quickly led them to include me as a friend 
fast. Being with them and hanging out with them gave me a good insight in Burkinabè and 
Ouagalais who were not prominently active in the political sphere, but did certainly think 
about politics a lot. I learned about their fears, why they were angry, and especially what 
motivated them to hit the streets as well. They did not ‘label’ themselves as politically active, 
but they did certainly have political agency. Some friends became informants and proved to 
be very valuable in my understanding of the Burkinabè context. I will discuss some of their 
stories in the following chapters. Always anonymously, unless they indicated that they wanted 
to be mentioned.  
 
Source: Picture taken by Bob (Balai Citoyen). Fiona and 500+ students, taking notes at a public debate on the 
involvement of the youth at the elections, Université de Ouagadougou, July 2nd, 2015.    
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Lastly, I would like to stress how I’ve experienced the ongoing process of meaning-making 
and collection of data. The sometimes overwhelming ‘task’ of putting field notes and 
conversations with people into something ‘academically relevant’ has made many of my 
nights sleepless. After my first interview I already became aware of how crucial it is to write 
down my thoughts, even though my recorder was on too. My first interviews were a way of 
finding my path – maybe drafting my story in the complex political and social reality that I 
was trying to understand. I therefore recorded all my interviews, but while asking questions 
and engaging in conversations with interviewees, I would also write down my thoughts on 
things they said, or which direction I would think of – if I would see any connections with 
theory or my own observations. My field notes not only consisted of notes on daily life and 
encounters, transcriptions of interviews and audio-visual material (audio, video and photos). 
They include my diary in which I kept track of the development of thoughts and lines of 
thinking. It is true that while doing fieldwork, my focus has shifted multiple times, and my 
initial idea that was written down in my research proposal had crumbled. I argue however that 
this is not a bad thing, but rather a sign that I was able to adapt and learn from the Burkinabè 
context.  
   Coming home and seeing a massive pile of data and field notes before me underlined 
that “by becoming aware of the process of writing down, a researcher does not simply record 
events, but is actively creating realities and meanings. The researcher is shaping observed 
moments as scenes, characters, dialogue and actions”, (Emerson, Fretz & Shaw, 2001, p. 
822). In the  process of writing down ‘what happened’, I was urged to look at my data in a 
reflexive manner, and thus recognizing that my texts do not represent an independent order or 
reality – rather my texts, including this thesis, is implicated in the work of reality-construction 
(Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994). Moreover, this implies that the process of writing down 
fieldwork notes and constructing my version of reality implied focussing on my research 
questions, and restricting me in some ways, rather than telling ‘all’. My intention is to tell the 
stories of people whose political agency had been triggered by events, by the increasing 
access to ICTs, which allowed them to have a voice in the direction that change had to go. 
  From my field notes it became evident that my line of thought and notes were very 
different towards the end of my fieldwork, as compared to those that I had written down in the 
beginning. Getting to know a city, a certain lifestyle, behaviour, talk and codes of people, and 
also adapting to this lifestyle myself, meant that I (often subconsciously) got used to some 
things that might have seemed odd or surprising in the beginning. This situational 
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knowledge17 leads to understanding the context better, but it also led to different field notes 
and scribbles in my dairy which were more focussed on the line of thought about what 
triggers people to join, act, or think, for example, rather than just politics is everywhere 
(something that I used as a line of thought early on during fieldwork). 
  The process of fieldwork, in the field as well as after coming back home, indicated for 
me that “you don’t think your way into a different way of acting, you act your way into a 
different way of thinking” (Smith, 2013, in the Militant Research Handbook). Only by doing, 
one experiences, and by reflection upon one’s experience, one becomes aware of how much 
one has learned and changed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 This is something that we extensively discussed in seminars after returning from fieldwork. And I would 
therefore like to dedicate my understanding of ‘situational knowledge’ to prof. dr. Han van Dijk.  
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1. « Nous sommes des enfants de Sankara » 
Thomas Sankara 
« On peut tuer un homme, mais on peut pas tuer ses idées », 18 a famous quote by Thomas 
Sankara, president of Burkina Faso from 1984 till 1987. He spoke these words a week before 
he died. He is remembered by many as a charismatic, forceful and outspoken leader. As the 
first among a junta of young military officers, he took power in Upper Volta (what was then 
still the name of present Burkina Faso) in a military coup in 1983, and became president in 
1984 (Prairie, 2007). Sankara grew up in a turbulent period in the Upper Volta, reflecting 
what was going on in the world at large. Like Upper Volta did in 1960, many countries in 
Africa had acquired their independence only a decade ago and were struggling to shape up 
and survive in the midst of the Cold War. A few years into independence its first president 
Yameogo was ousted in a coup d’état in 1966. After this coup, according to Harsch (2014), 
many young intellectuals, including Sankara, began to see the army as an instrument for 
social change. It could serve as an institution to discipline corruption, counterbalance the 
influence of traditional chiefs and push towards modernization of the country.   
  In 1980, four years before Sankara took power, the army carried out another coup and 
ousted president Lamizana, because of “the erosion of state authority” (Harsch, 2014). 
Sankara, who had by then gotten himself into a leadership position in the army, opposed a 
strong military take-over however. In the meantime he built up relationships with the student 
and labour organizations. Moreover, as Minister of Information in the new government, he 
encouraged the press to be weary of corruption and expose such practices. In the following 
years leading up to 1983, the government of Jean-Baptiste Ouédraogo became more 
repressive, which prompted Sankara to publicly announce his exit from  government during a 
radio broadcast, in which he strongly urged for more freedom of expression: “Woe to those 
who would gag their people” (Harsch, 2014).  
  Because of his challenging act and to prevent further outcry, Sankara was stationed at 
a military garrison far away from the capital city of Ouagadougou. However, his close 
relationship with the student and labour organizations proved helpful. In August 1983, he took 
over the government and installed the Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR). 19 Not only 
was he backed by young radical revolutionaries, activists and young officers, the population 
of the Upper Volta hit the streets to welcome their new  leader, who embarked on a 
                                                          
18 Translates to: “You can kill a man, but you cannot kill his ideas”.  
19 Translates to: “National Council of the Revolution”  
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revolutionary course (Harsch, 2014). He began by changing the name of the country from 
Upper Volta into Burkina Faso, in which the citizens are called Burkinabè. It was an attempt 
to unite the country. Burkina means honourable men (hommes intègres) in Mooré, the 
language of the Mossi (the largest ethnic group in Burkina Faso). Faso means land or house in 
Dioula, making Burkina Faso the land of the honourable men (or people): le pays des hommes 
intègres. He included the plural of bè, (‘people’ or ‘children of’ in Fulfulde, the language of 
the Fulani people from the north) when talking about the inhabitants of Burkina Faso, the 
Burkinabè: le peuple du pays des hommes intègres. Not only did he change the name of the 
country and its people, he also changed the national flag to the red and green, with a five-
pointed star in the middle. It symbolizes the Pan-African ideal, breaking with the colonial past 
and unifying with other African ex-colonies. Red stands for the revolution, green for the 
abundance of natural riches and the star epitomizes the guiding light of the revolution. 
 
Anti-imperialism, the environment and a focus on women 
In the three years during which Sankara ruled Burkina Faso, his anti-imperialistic and Pan-
Africanist ideas led to many famous speeches and quotes, but above all to action. Even before 
he changed the name of the country in August 1984 in the service of its unification, he 
appointed representatives from different ethnic groups in his government. Next to that, he 
ordained that television news from the state-owned media would henceforth be presented in 
French, Mooré and other languages, and that radio stations (till the present day the most 
important medium in the country) started broadcasting in eleven of Burkina Faso’s languages.  
  Not only did Sankara take action to foster a sense of national unity, he also attempted 
to break away from the economic dependence on France and other countries, by making 
Burkina Faso exploit its own resources more. This included a program to give everyone 
access to clean drinking water, to which purpose he set up the Ministry of Water. Moreover, 
he tried to raise awareness of the loss of vegetation in the country and the growing 
desertification. In the search for sustainable, peaceful and systematic ways to preserve the 
environment, the population was asked to join in preservation activities, rather than penalize 
those who cut trees. Sankara spoke of a democratic and popular struggle to save the trees 
(Harsch, 2014). Now government inspired tree-planting initiatives became a regular thing at 
ceremonies of all sorts, including family affairs. This practice of collective tree-planting 
continues to the present day and has been taken over by, amongst others, the Balai Citoyen, a 
citizen movement that will be discussed at length in the third chapter, during inauguration 
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ceremonies of new clubs. Sankara’s way of talking in terms of democracy, the popular 
struggle, and the unity of the Burkinabè as one united people is something that the Balai 
Citoyen uses a lot in their communication too.     
  Not only did Sankara focus on environmental and anti-imperialistic issues, he also put 
a strong emphasis on the role and emancipation of women and their (political) advancement 
within Burkinabè society. Sankara saw gender equality as the core of any revolutionary 
movement, and hence he appointed women to prominent positions in government and in the 
army (Harsch, 2014). He created the Women’s Union and he outlawed polygamy and forced 
marriages, and established March 8th as a day (plus a week) to honour Burkinabè women. He 
outlawed female genital mutilation whilst setting up educational programs to make sure that 
people knew why it was banned (Harsch, 2014). The promotion of women into public 
positions provoked some discontent among certain prominent male members of Burkinabè 
society (Wilkins, 1989); nevertheless Sankara put his words into action. He paved the way for 
many women to stand up for themselves and claim a place within society. 20   
  As Sankara put in place many rigorous policies to ensure the development of Burkina 
Faso as a country as well as a people, he was rumoured to be authoritarian and stubborn. And, 
as became evident after three years in power, his actions and anti-imperialistic approach were 
not appreciated by everyone. According to Manji and Ekine (2012, p. 35), Blaise Compaoré, 
Sankara’s long-time friend and right-hand, is widely seen as the person who intervened on 
behalf of the French and Western interests to bring the anti-imperialist, radical politics of 
Sankara to an end. He supposedly let him get killed, even though he died “of natural causes”, 
buried him and took his place as president. In the 27 years that Blaise Comaporé was ruling 
Burkina Faso, not once was it possible to reopen Sankara’s grave and investigate his bodily 
remains. “Of course nobody believes that he died of natural causes, but what could we do? I 
guess many people were afraid to speak up about Sankara and demand justice”, claims C. 21 
After Compaoré was ousted, the ‘Sankara case’ was reopened, 28 years after his death.    
 
Gravediggers 
On a hot day, Monday 22nd of June 2015, I wanted to visit the grave of Capitaine Sankara, 
which had just been opened a couple of weeks before. After 28 years, the transition 
                                                          
20 Chapter 2 will highlight four stories of young women that have claimed their place within politics, some 
leaning on Sankarist ideas of how society needs to be structured. 
21 For most of my informants I will use the initial of their first or last name, since in some cases they do not wish 
to be public with their name and function or profession. A list of their characteristics can be found in Annex A.  
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government had consented to open the grave in search for Sankara’s bodily remains. Was it 
the body of the former president? And if so, how did he die? I had not been able to attend the 
official opening ceremony at the grave site, as I had been engaged in field work away from 
the capital. Upon my return to Ouagadougou, I wanted to make up for this missed opportunity 
and visit the site where he had been presumably buried after his death. I went there with Aziz. 
  Aziz, 22, is from Dori. He is a street vendor and jewellery maker: a self-employed 
entrepreneur. He left his hometown in the northern part of Burkina Faso at the age of 15. 
Having only attended primary school, and not having too many options for making money 
back home, he left for Ouagadougou to carve out a living for himself. In Ouagadougou he 
found a spot at the Jardin d’Amitié and started selling things to tourists and making money 
translating for other vendors. He is fluent in Mooré, Dioula, Fulfulde, Tamasheq (a Touareg 
language spoken throughout Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, amongst others) and French. And 
he is extremely mobile, meaning that he follows the money and the trade, while travelling 
across the country. I met Aziz through mutual friends and we started hanging out. I did not 
know at the time that he would become crucial for my understanding the younger generation 
of Burkinabè, and that he would give me a great insight into the driving force behind the 
recent uprisings and the present change in Burkina Faso.    
  On that hot Monday Aziz and I took his moto22 and went to the cemetery in Dagnoën 
in Ouagadougou. Aziz had been there once, to pay his homage, and he wanted to see what it 
was like, now that Sankara’s body had reportedly been exhumed. It took us a while to find the 
place and we had to ask around a few times. When entering the cemetery, there was no one to 
be found, other than some stray dogs and three little boys. We asked them if they knew where 
the grave of Sankara used to be and they pointed to a pile of breeze blocks and heaps of sand. 
It seemed strange but we went anyway, and saw that where the grave of the former president 
of Burkina Faso used to be, now only sand was left.  
  During the exhumation ceremony on May 26th investigators had found human 
remains, which they used to reconstruct the skeletons, in order to find out whether or not the 
bodies found were actually those of Thomas Sankara and twelve other soldiers (Thibault, 
2015). After the ceremony, they had left the former grave a shambles. 23 It gave me an uneasy 
feeling - and not just me. Aziz and the boys who showed us the way were upset too. Before I 
knew they started digging, and I joined. We dug out all the pieces of the former tombstone we 
                                                          
22 A small motor bike/moped that is a popular mode of transport in Burkina Faso.  
23 For the time being Sankara has got a new symbolic grave, while his body is still under investigation. There are 
plans to clear the Dagnoën cemetery and replace it with a housing project.   
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could lay our hands on; sweeping away the sand that had buried most of the stones and 
digging out the remaining parts of the tomb. While digging, more boys joined, until we were 
six. Together we re-created Sankara’s name, and the flag of Burkina Faso and laid it out in the 
sand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Sankara’s grave at the Dagnoën cemetery, Ouagadougou. Repainted in 2014 by supporters for the 27th 
anniversary of his assassination. Photo by James Robb. 
 
Source: F. Dragstra, taken on June 22nd, 2015 at the Dagnoën cemetery, Ouagadougou.  
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When we were done, the boys all seemed very content. I however still felt uneasy, and shared 
my story about the left-alone grave site with C, a friend, journalist and a member of the Balai 
Citoyen. I assumed he knew all along that the grave had been left like that, but he was 
shocked. “How could the authorities leave the tomb of our national hero shattered like that”?   
(Field notes, June 23rd, 2015, Ouagadougou). I couldn’t tell, but it made me wonder. 
Apparently nobody had gone back after the ceremony to check. The shattered pieces of the 
tomb of their national hero, abandoned just like that, meant to me that, at least sometimes and 
for some, symbols from the past can be more powerful than remnants of stone.  
  Sankara’s grave could only be opened for investigation after Blaise Compaoré was 
ousted as president. And only recently it was officially reported that Sankara did, indeed, not 
die of natural causes, as was stated in his death report, but that he was shot multiple times. 
Blaise Compaoré and General Gilbert Diendéré are the prime suspects in the murder 
investigation. Nevertheless, DNA tests still have to prove whether or not one of the exhumed 
bodies is that of the former revolutionary leader of Burkina Faso (Butty, 2015).  
 
Norbert Zongo  
Many argue that Compaoré systematically tried to conceal the truth about the sudden death of 
Sankara and to dismiss claims for justice. Norbert Zongo, journalist, publisher and editor of 
l’Independent, a local newspaper, likewise prominently figures as someone of whom people 
say: “I am proud to be Burkinabè, because he was too” (Field notes, throughout, but 
especially during a press conference of the Balai Citoyen, June 2nd 2015). He is a historical 
figure who still inspires many (young) people and fills them with pride. Zongo died at the 
hands of the former regime after his newspaper had begun an investigation into the murder of 
a driver who worked for the brother of then president Blaise Compaoré.  
  The death of Zongo in 1998, of which the government claimed that it was a car 
accident, sparked huge demonstrations. For many, as Fessy (2014) indicated, the Zongo case 
was a turning point since it installed confidence in citizens about their own rights, freedom of 
speech in particular. Moreover, as Hagberg (2002, p. 218) states, the massive demonstrations 
after the death of Zongo broke the silence surrounding impunity – the freedom from 
punishment for ‘blood’ and economic crimes committed by those in positions of political 
power, and led to demands for justice and accountability. Until that moment, since the death 
of Sankara, the country had been silent about impunity. Nevertheless, even after these 
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massive demonstrations and cries of “Trop c’est trop” (Hagberg, 2002), 24 it would take the 
Burkinabè another 12 years to oust Compaoré and even then, still, the truth about both 
Sankara and Zongo’s deaths was not revealed immediately. Yet, the student protests and 
demonstrations after Zongo’s death at the time already showed that the Burkinabè were 
capable of mobilising themselves collectively in huge numbers to demand justice (and 
change). Moreover, it was an indication that the Burkinabè were fed up with the culture of 
impunity that existed and exists among political power-holders and that they would not be 
silent any longer (Hagberg, 2002).   
 
Source: Public Facebook page of the Balai Citoyen and poster made by Semfilms. 
This poster was used for the commemoration of Zongo’s death (17th anniversary), 
and for the baptism of the street in Ouagadougou that was named after him. 
   
 
 
Today Thomas Sankara’s face and quotes can be found on T-shirts, on pictures all over 
Facebook, and on flyers and posters. Likewise, Norbert Zongo’s face and quotes are quite 
popular and illustrate the unabated outcry for justice and the truth, in memory of who he was. 
He too continues to serve as an example to fellow Burkinabès fighting for the freedom of 
expression. To commemorating him and his legacy the national press centre in Ouagadougou 
is named after him, and since December 12th 2015 a street in the capital Ouagadougou now 
also bears his name. Still, to this day (end of 2016) the Balai Citoyen and Semfilms (a film 
production company supported by the Danish and the US embassies) urge for justice and hold 
get-togethers to discuss ‘who will be held accountable’, through mobilising people on 
Facebook with the help of political discussion groups. In December 2016, Semfilms and the 
Balai Citoyen held a sit-in in front of the Palace of Justice (Palais de la Justice) to demand 
justice for Zongo.  
 
                                                          
24 Translates to: “Enough is Enough!”  
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Source: public Facebook profile of R, picture taken by him. . On the picture members of the Balai Citoyen, other 
activists and Didier Awadi, a Senegalese activist and rapper (T-shirt of ’18 ans de…’ with Zongo’s face on it).   
 
Dabo Boukary  
On May 19th 2015 I saw posters all over the premises of the Université de Ouagadougou 
announcing the remembrance ceremony of Dabo Boukary. The ceremony was organised by 
the Union Générale des Étudiants Burkinabè (UBEG) 25 and the Mouvement Burkinabè des 
Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples (MBDHP). 26 Boukary was a medical student. He was 
arrested during the student protests in 1990 and later found dead. Amnesty (1991) reported 
that he had been kept in detention, mistreated and eventually killed by security forces. As in 
previous cases, the government again failed to give information, stating that he simply 
disappeared. Only in 1997, as a new wave of student demonstrations and massive strikes 
erupted, people got first scraps of information about his death (Manji & Ekine, 2012).  
  Boukary and Zongo were two of the many who ‘simply disappeared’ in the era of 
Compaoré’s rule. Yet, the more Compaoré and his ruling elite wanted the people to believe 
these victims had simply vanished, the more they were sawing of the branch they were sitting 
on. People remember, and even though Compaoré was making sure that investigations could 
not start on the murders of Sankara, Zongo, Boukary and others, they lived on as camarades 
                                                          
25 General Union of Burkinabè Students 
26 The MBDHP were also one of the key organisers of the demonstrations that were held after the death of 
Norbert Zongo in 1998, (Hagberg, 2002). Translates to: Burkinabè Movement for the Rights of Men and People.  
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de la lutte and martyrs27 in the minds and revolutionary heart and spirit of the Burkinabè.  
  During the 25th anniversary of Boukary’s death, the huge auditorium of the university 
filled to the brim with participants in the celebration. The girl next to me, a student in law and 
political science, told me that many people had been mobilized to come via Facebook. She 
said that she was there because she thought it important to keep remembering those that had 
fallen. There were discussions on the current state of Burkinabè politics, and what Boukary’s 
battle means today.  
  “Today we share the same battle. We must remember. We must understand the past 
events in our current times”. The president of l’UGEB (Union Générale des Étudiants 
Burkinabè) takes the stage and states that “In the past two years people were afraid to do 
something, to say something and to express themselves. Journalists did not know what to do 
with information because they were afraid. We did our discussions in the dark [offline and 
face-to-face] and not in public because we were afraid. But now we are not afraid! Respect 
the march! How easy can it be?” Yet, even now that Blaise had gone, 28 one should still be 
careful and never stop thinking critically. Amidst all this inspiring talk the girl next to me 
whispers in my ear that she and her friends are still afraid (Field notes, May 19th, 2015, 
Université de Ouagadougou). I cannot quite grasp if her still existent fear was one of speaking 
in public, which many girls and young women don’t do or dare, or if it was a fear for the 
regime. However, for me it was an important moment in which again, symbolism and big 
words sometimes out-voice still existent fear, anger or sorrow.     
  C told me that: “For us demanding justice for Sankara, Zongo and Boukary means 
that we will not be left in the dark. We are not a horde of sheep that you can round up and 
leave for ‘stupid’. We are one – we are Burkinabè, and we demand justice for those that stood 
for our country and make us proud to be Burkinabè.”   
                                                          
27 The word martyrs is used in public opinion to refer to those that died in the fight for freedom of expression, in 
the fights against impunity, and those who died during the popular uprisings of 2014 and 2015.  
28 He was in exile in Ivory Coast during this speech 
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Source: F. Dragstra, taken on May 19th, 2015 at the Université de Ouagadougou. Remembrance ceremony of 
the 25th anniversary of Dabo Boukary’s death.  
 
The revival of past political heroes and their significance for the Burkinabè uprisings 
During Ouaga Jazz, Ouagadougou’s yearly jazz festival, I was enjoying a concert with two 
friends when all of a sudden a group of young men started chanting along with the slammer 
who was taking the stage (little did I know that I would become friends with many of them 
later on). At 3.00 in the morning they stood up and shouted at the top of their voices:  
 
Nous sommes du pays des hommes intègres – c’est Burkina Faso d’où je viens –  
être intègre, être Burkinabè, est être révolutionnaire! 29 
Être intègre, être Burkinabè, être révolutionnaire. These phrases for me symbolise how 
Sankara and his spirit live on in the minds and hearts of young Burkinabè. It speaks louder 
than many winding descriptions as to where the Burkinabè get their sense of collective 
                                                          
29 Text and performance by Valian. Translates to: “We are from the land of the honourable man – It is Burkina 
Faso where I’m from – being ‘honourable’, being Burkinabè is being revolutionary!  
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identity and unity from. They are from the land of the honourable people, which means they 
ought to be revolutionary.   
  Whereas during the time of Compaoré’s rule talking about Sankara was taboo, his 
legacy is stronger than ever. Immediately after Compaoré seized power and it became known 
that Sankara had died, of which very little information was available in the pre-Internet days, 
the new regime launched a campaign to downsize Sankara’s policies, character and image 
(Keita, 2015). The new ruling elite said that Sankara had been mentally unstable and that he 
was not to be trusted. It undid many of his revolutionary ideas, such as the ban on polygamy 
and female circumcision. Compaoré later on tried to make believe he also had had a say in 
Sankara’s revolutionary ideas and – even - that he had been the driving force behind 
Sankara’s revolution. Nevertheless, however hard Compaoré tried to become ‘their’ leader, he 
never succeeded in becoming as popular as Sankara, especially amongst the younth.  
  The Burkinabè, and especially the younger generation, make use of Sankara’s image 
in many ways and incorporate his image and thoughts into popular culture. They listen to a 
handful of his recorded speeches and sell, buy and promote T-shirts with his face and 
inspiring quotes. Most of these young Burkinabè were not even born when Sankara was 
staging his revolution. Nevertheless, they take pride in being from the country of Sankara, and 
even refer to themselves as “Nous sommes des enfants de Sankara”, 30 wanting to be part of 
Sankara’s Burkina Faso, not that of Compaoré (Field notes throughout meetings and rallies, 
and based on interviews with activists, 2015). 
  When Compaoré introduced the referendum that would ‘decide’ whether or not the 
president was eligible for another mandate, it was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. 
Burkina Faso has a past of popular discontent with the ‘Trop c’est trop’ movement after 
Zongo’s death in 1998 (Hagberg, 2002; Manji & Ekine, 2012) and the high cost of living and 
food prices riots in 2008 (Engels, 2015; Manji & Ekine, 2012), to name just a few. However, 
these uprisings, often local to Bobo-Dioulasso, Koudougou or the capital city of 
Ouagadougou, did not lead to nationwide insurrections. The cultural memory of Thomas 
Sankara as revolutionary leader and example was suppressed in order to create a Burkina Faso 
in the image of Compaoré. But he failed. During Compaoré’s rule by impunity (Hagberg, 
2002), when accountability for politicians was hard to find, the revolutionary history of 
Burkina Faso symbolized by Sankara, Zongo, Boukary and many others lived on in the 
memories of the Burkinabè. The build-up of anger, frustration and endurance of longstanding 
                                                          
30 Translates to: “We are the children of Sankara”.  
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poverty, little economic and social change and the impunity shielding off the ruling elite, led 
the Burkinabè to take measures into their own hands. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Still from a video report from France24 © Title: ‘Generation Sankara’.  
During the time of mobilisation and growing belief in the possibility of political change, or 
even a major political uprising nationwide, Sankara was used as a rallying point, making the 
Burkinabè remember where they come from. The social movements, opposition groups and 
other collectives that rose up against the Compaoré regime, used Sankara’s legacy and the 
injustice and uncertainty around his death to create a shared frame of grievance (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012; Rennick, 2013). As a means to mobilize the masses and, especially, the 
younger generation, Sankara (and Zongo) were revived and brought to the fore as national 
heroes who died because of the regime of Compaoré. The fact that Compaoré tried everything 
in his power to wipe out and/or change the memory and legacy that Sankara had left behind, 
had made the Burkinabè even more prone to understanding their former revolutionary leader 
as their example: “Seul la lutte libère”!31   
   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 Translates to: “Only the fight will set us free!”  
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A young activist that I got to know through others summed it up for me: “Sankara is seen as 
a symbol of freedom. He was the one that listened to his people and respected the freedom 
and will of the people. He gave us the power to be what we wanted to be: a free people, proud 
and ‘intègre’”. And, even more concise and politicized: “If they truly are the children of their 
Capitaine, only a revolution would free them from their oppressors”, (Field notes, 
Ouagadougou, June 8th, 2015).  
 
Source: young Burkinabè during the protests in October 2014. Photo by: Joe Penny/Reuters 
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2. « Quand la jeunesse se met débout… » 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Public Facebook page of 
“Club Thomas Isidore Noël Sankara, 
one of the clubs of cibals in a 
neighbourhood in Ouagadougou. 
 
A new conscious generation is born  
N, a journalist and a self-proclaimed cyber-activist, tells me that a young conscious generation 
of Burkinabè is born, because of actions of certain individuals and collectives like Smockey (a 
rapper) and the Balai Citoyen. “Their actions got noticed by the youth. It first started with the 
college and university students who found information – yes I could say online, but also 
through music – and became aware that ‘ce monsieur là’ [Blaise Compaoré] had to go”. She 
continues to states that, of course, the young people would discuss this with their parents and 
they would sometimes not agree: “Many older people thought, ‘why should we go into such a 
hassle, leave that man to do his thing’. However I think that many of them were scared. 
Scared of change, scared of the regime”. Nevertheless, she adds that in this new conscious 
generation that is born, there are also people who do not agree with the protesters and the 
social movements that wanted Compaoré out of office.  
  I have asked N, and many others, what made this new generation so conscious and 
active. They did not necessarily know the answer, but most of the time the direction of the 
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discussions would point to that they were fed-up. She highlights that for many, a change in 
the (political) system was almost a necessity in order to get a brighter future. Working with 
the regime of Compaoré, when tensions were already this high, was a no-go. Therefore, those 
interested in a future without Compaoré discussed possibilities of change almost everywhere 
they could. This meant: face-to-face with friends, at meetings, rallies and organised debates, 
as well as online through WhatsApp, Facebook groups and Twitter. The radio was (and still 
is) an important vehicle for the dissemination of information and the increase in number of 
political debates too, as many of my informants have noted. As N, C, Y, and a journalist at 
Radio Oméga have said in interviews: Radio Oméga organises political debates every Sunday 
where people, many of them young, would listen to critical political analyses, when they also 
had the option to interact. Not only could they could call in to share their thoughts, they also 
had options to share their ideas through Facebook and Twitter hashtags such as: #politique, 
#Burkina or #lwili.32    
  Many of my informants have argued that access to information and then transforming 
this information into knowledge about, for instance, the political history of Burkina or 
learning from the Arab Spring in Tunisia, awakened the political spirit in people and changed 
their mind-set. Even though young people are becoming more informed and very active in the 
public debates – online and offline – “there is still a lot to do”, as N and Y mention. Y and C 
mention that those who get involved in political parties become less critical. They do not 
involve themselves in political debate because of public interest but because of political self-
interest. What needs to be done, as N mentions, “is give young people better information. 
They need a different framework in which they can understand their country’s history and 
through which they can understand their engagement. Why do they interact with politics and 
with whom?” N states that young people need to learn their history and redefine it before they 
can start looking at the future. H, a manager of ICT for Development projects, agrees and 
states that the issue of connectivity [in the big cities] is not very prominent – many young 
people either have mobile phones, smartphones, or go to cyber cafés – but the issue of making 
young people aware of political dynamics is more crucial. In that vein, V (a 25 year old car 
dealer), notes that all the political and revolutionary turmoil was not a bad thing. He remains 
critical however, stating that young people still had to think for themselves instead of just 
“parroting those that have already taken the floor”. “Politics is a dirty game in which people 
can easily be bribed or persuaded; therefore we need to be vigilant of our own and other 
                                                          
32 Lwili means little bird in Mooré.  
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peoples’ political actions”, underline V, C and R.    
  Honwana’s (2015) concept of waithood can be best understood in the way that young 
Burkinabè felt unheard by the ruling elite in their daily struggles. These struggles, as many of 
my friends and informants have mentioned, are mostly that they have little or no economic 
and social leverage. With huge unemployment rates and no clear (nor bright) future, many 
adolescents began to feel like ‘politics was only something for the big men’, ‘they did not 
want anything to do with it’, or that acting politically ‘would not change anything’. As 
Honwana’s (2015) waithood describes, next to the common identity and critical 
consciousness that leads youth to challenge the established order, they are not literally 
waiting, but they struggle to become a socially accepted adult. In a hierarchical society in 
which age means respect and wisdom, for some this may have resulted in a sense of 
powerlessness (Bordonaro & Payne, 2012). Moreover, when youth feel powerless and 
unheard, either individually or as a group, how can they make a difference?  
  C states that the Balai Citoyen did a good job in bringing politics closer to the people, 
especially the younger generation. They did so, amongst other things, by mobilising young 
‘cibals’, 33 and sharing their revolutionary thoughts through Facebook and concerts. The 
concerts of Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah, both associated with the Balai Citoyen, brought 
together thousands of young people in Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso. While enjoying 
rap music, they were also prone to the message the Balai Citoyen wanted to spread: “be 
aware, stay vigilant, mobilise – it is time for the people. La patrie ou la mort, nous 
vaincrons!”34       
  
Ciné Droit Libre and the importance of film and music  
During an interview about the importance of film and music in Burkinabè society and the 
influence of these forms of art on political engagement, L, a coordinator at a creative industry 
NGO, noted that the mentality of people changes as soon as they get information that they had 
not heard before. And “of course”, new media and the spread of political information, while 
giving the people the possibility to interact, proved to be very important in the lead up to the 
new conscious generation of Burkinabè that L also saw.  
  Next to this, political debates on the premises of the Université de Ouagadougou were 
often attended by many. There were several organisations, such as Semfilms and 
                                                          
33 Roughly translates to: “citizens”, but specifically those citizens that joined the Balai Citoyen.  
34 Field notes from a Smockey concert in Bobo-Dioulasso on April 8th, 2015. The slogan ‘la patrie ou la mort, 
nous vaincrons’ also stems from the time of Sankara.  
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Thébatteurs35 that organised public debates on the aftermath of the revolution, as well as on 
where Burkina Faso would head to next. They would accompany this with the screening of a 
movie, for example about Sankara, and discuss the movie in relation to current political 
events. Moreover, Semfilms would organise debate contests at the university grounds during 
their annual film festival Ciné Droit Libre Festival, and hold debate competitions. The 
screening of films and joining in concerts is another way of getting information. Even though 
they are not political texts or manifests, they do spark political interest, and address the need 
for (perhaps collective) political action from the youth. 
 
Source: F. Dragstra. Debate during Ciné Droit Libré Festival at Université de Ouagadougou. July 1st 2015.  
                                                          
35 The blending of the words ‘tea’ and ‘debaters’, meaning that the “thédebats” are organized in an open and 
relaxed atmosphere.   
63 
 
Source: F. Dragstra, screening of film during Ciné Droit Libre Festival, after which a debate followed. This 
picture was taken at one of the campuses of the university where students live.   
In May 2015, the Reggae City Festival was held on the date of Bob Marley’s death, 
celebrating the life and legacy of a ‘free man’.  During the festival there were hundreds of 
young Burkinabès chanting Bob Marley’s classics, while his texts were translated in Mooré 
by the artists on stage. Reggae City Festival was for free, there were cheap drinks, and it was 
held at the Maison de la Jeunesse. 36 One of the artists sang about bad politics and governance 
and about Blaise Compaoré. Every time he called Blaise’s name the whole crowd chanted: 
“Bye Bye!” The next artist, Karim, sang “nous sommes fatigues”,37 and everybody joined him 
in shouting this at the top of their voices. There was a strong sense of belonging and 
togetherness the music and performances released and fostered. I was duly impressed. V, the 
friend that I was with, told me that he thought the great majority of all present that night 
would reflect on the lyrics and the songs and open up their minds for change. Moreover, he 
stated that he thinks the only way to reach the younger generation of Burkinabès who are not 
yet politically active, and make them reflect on their impact on society, is through mass 
                                                          
36 Translates to: “House for the Youth”.  
37 Translates to: “We are tired”.  
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musical events in which social and political issues are being discussed. However, he also 
thought that there is a need to look further than just the revolution by thinking about what 
comes after. In Burkina Faso throughout, but especially in Bobo-Dioulasso and 
Ouagadougou, there were many musical and film events in which social and political issues 
were being discussed. It can be seen as a low-entry-level way of tackling the threshold of 
more formal debates, in which, again, young people often don’t feel welcome, or won’t get 
invited at. Discussing political issues that young people deal with every day too, on a more 
inclusive level, makes that such events can have a huge impact on how people view political 
dynamics, how they may influence them to act politically and, for example, choose to join a 
movement.  
 
Young women and how ICTs helped them to stand up (for themselves)  
Even though Sankara put a heavy focus on women participation and engagement in politics; it 
often proved difficult for women to navigate their way in the myriad of politics which is often 
dominated by men. 38 Nevertheless, during the time of research, and I am sure also before and 
after, many political parties organised conferences and days focussing especially on women’s 
engagement in politics and female leadership. I was present at one of these meetings on May 
14th 2015 where Club Vision Action and the MPP (Movement pour le Peuple et le Progress – 
a political party) together organised a day for female leadership and youth engagement in 
politics, free for everyone. The day existed of speeches, amongst others from Juliette Congo, 
one of the co-organisers of the “Marche des Femmes” 39 of October 27th during the uprising in 
2014, and a prominent member of the MPP, and Céline Ouedraogo, deputy treasurer of the 
MPP, who gave convincing talks about how young women needed to step up their game, and 
needed to become the leaders of their generation.  
  What struck me in the speech of Mme Congo was how she put an emphasis on that in 
order for your women to become leaders; they had to respect their fathers. Give them water 
when they would ask them to, and cook them food. Respect for elders and your parents are 
evident, although I (with my Western mind-set and different attitude towards what ‘being 
independent’ means) did not quite see how young women would become leaders when they 
had to cook food for their fathers. The crowd – existing of 60% men and 40% women more or 
less – seemed to understand what she had said however. In the entire day, there was only one 
                                                          
38 Even at the public debates that were organised during the Ciné Droit Libre festival at Unviersité de 
Ouagadougou, the men outnumbered the women. See picture above.   
39 Translates to: ‘March of the Women’.  
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young woman ‘brave’ enough to stand up and express her opinion, something which I also 
found interesting. Maybe the environment was not comfortable and safe enough for them to 
speak their minds, or they just had nothing to say? Nevertheless, a day focussed on action, 
long-term vision and leadership skills for young women and youth engagement in politics, 
proved, at least for me, more as a campaign stunt for the MPP instead of an engaged 
discussion with young politically active women. 
  
  
Source: F. Dragstra, May 14th 2015, Meeting CVA “Young Female Leadership and the political engagement of 
young people”.  
  Even though many young women did not speak publicly during the leadership event of 
the MPP, I did meet several women who shared their personal (political) story with me. One 
of them is T. T currently has one of the highest positions within the MPP and is one of the 
leaders of the women division of the party. T is fashionable, single, talks fast, laughs loudly 
and is very outspoken. She is instantly likeable. She comes from a family that was not 
politically active; however she always had the ambition to do something bigger than ‘just get 
a regular office job’. Nevertheless, within the old political system that was ruled by the CDP, 
there was no room for development, change or new idea, so she felt like she never had the 
opportunity to get into politics. When the MPP started to take from, she got inspired by the 
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liberty of a new party, and she took advantage of the space it offered her and hence developed 
her own political path. She states that for her one of the most important things is the 
inspiration this new party gave her. She states that “through social media I saw an 
opportunity to share my personal message and opinions which offered my first opening to a 
political career”. She wants to inspire other women to do the same: “go into politics, let your 
voice be heard and do not be afraid”.   
  A similar story of that of T is N’s story. She is not a member of a political party but is 
surely very active politically and online. She uses social media, Twitter, Facebook and her 
personal blog, to share her (often outspoken and critical) opinions. She mainly blogs about 
women rights and especially the (ab)use of whitening cream for the skin. Once over coffee, 
she explained the ambiguity of many women that are in high positions in politics. They have 
speeches in which they tell young women and girls to stand up for themselves and to 
appreciate themselves for who they are, while at the same time they “bleach their skins just 
until they look like ivory”. N explains that this is an example of how politicians work with 
paradoxes, “which reflects upon their policies also”: They say one thing, but they do the 
exact opposite. “Images and words of politicians, also the female ones, do not reflect Burkina 
Faso’s reality”. N highlights many of these stories, speeches and images on her blog. She 
calls herself a cyber-activist and states that from the second she wakes up until the moment 
she goes to bed she checks her phone: “Being able to stand up for yourself, also means that 
you need to know what is going on in the world”.  
  CE’s story is also that of a cyber-activist. C comes from a family of activists which 
heavily protested the regime of Blaise Compaoré. At an early age, CE and her little sister 
learned that they should question the regime. Their dad, an activist in the 70s, 80s and 90s, 
had always been critical of Compaoré’s ruling abilities and was a big fan of Sankara. CE and 
her sister have experienced several house raids by the army, when it was “that time again”, 
that the army was questioning her father. Growing up with frequent house raids and a critical 
undertone in her education, it almost seems self-evident that CE grew up to be an activist 
herself too. CE “luckily” had more means than just demonstrating in the streets against the 
regime, even though, she did that too, “of course”. For the entire period leading up to the 
protests in October 2014 (and during and after), CE had been very active on Facebook. Both 
on her personal Facebook page as well as in several political discussion groups she shared 
critical analyses, leaked videos and photos and called for demonstrations and road blocks. “I 
wanted to create more awareness and make sure that people knew what was going on. 
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Moreover, and this is still very important to me, I wanted to create support for those that were 
already on the streets. I wanted to show girls and women that I was there too: front row! 
There was no need to sit at home. Throw away your fear and fight for your freedom too!” CE 
is one of the faces that were often photographed by international media to show that the 
Burkinabè revolution was ‘inclusive’. This does not mean that there were no other women on 
the streets standing next to CE. However, CE and other women were a minority in most of the 
protests, which again highlights the importance of images and how they often distort the 
actuality by framing what the photographer wants you to see.  
  The last woman that I want to highlight is an activist and a prominent member of the 
Balai Citoyen. She is always present at the headquarters, operates as a steady rock for many 
of the men of the Balai and she is a member of the core team. She is a school teacher, but 
spends almost all of her time working for the Balai Citoyen. When I asked her why she chose 
to become a member and actively involve herself with the movement she said she did not 
have a choice. It was either that or “drowning in self-pity”. Her family is not per se a family 
of activists, however since the inception of the Balai she felt drawn to it and she never left. 
Sometimes when women participation in movements such as the Balai would pop up in 
conversations with others I would say that F is a prominent member. However, this was 
something that people often did not notice. They would say: “Yeah, but she is just like a 
man”, or “F doesn’t count”. Apparently F had become ‘one of the guys’, and did not fit into 
people’s idea of a women in politics anymore. She is not married and doesn’t have children 
(yet), she spends her days being politically active within a citizen movement led by men.  
   F, for me, is an example of a new generation of strong, politically active and conscious 
Burkinabè women that make their own decisions, independent of the opinions of others. 
Besides the stories mentioned above, I spoke and met dozens of young women that are, one 
way or another, engaged in politics and fight for humanitarian or societal issues. The above 
mentioned stories are an illustration of how, when coming from different backgrounds and 
having different (political) goals, social media and social movements offered them a way of 
letting their voices be heard and to actively take part in the change that Burkina Faso is going 
through.    
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3. « Notre nombre est notre force » 
Le Balai Citoyen: a new hybrid social movement? 
“The goal of the Balai Citoyen is to keep a watchful eye on behalf of the people. You cannot 
be a member of the government and at the same time criticize the work they do. We are there 
for the people and the people are part of what we are. This is why we keep such a close eye on 
the next steps within the political transition which is under the guidance of the army…. We 
are staying vigilant, and we ask the people to do so too”, (Z, a member of the Balai Citoyen).  
 
 
 
 
Source: The logo of the Balai 
Citoyen with their slogan beneath it. 
Taken from their public Facebook 
page.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Balai Citoyen, literally meaning the “Citizen Broom” as a reference to ‘the people 
cleaning the country’, or ‘sweeping a broom through the country’, is one of the most 
prominent social movements in Burkina Faso’s society, and they played a huge role before, 
during and after the uprisings in 2014 and 2015. The Balai officially saw the light of day in 
July 2013. Media, both national and international, dubbed Smockey (Serge Bambara) and 
Sams’K Le Jah (Karim Sama), a hip-hop and reggae artist respectively, as the ones who 
brought the movement to life. On the 18th of July, 2015, Smockey and Sams’K gathered people 
on the Place de la Nation (the Square of the Nation) in Ouagadougou, through public 
Facebook groups, as well as their own Facebook profiles. Because both of them were already 
known artists in Burkina, they had no problem in gathering thousands of young Burkinabè to 
the square that day, on which they launched the Balai Citoyen, a Facebook page and a song.   
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  Sams’K Le Jah is a reggae musician, radio host at Radio Oméga and a political 
activist. He was one of the members of the ‘Pioneers of the Revolution’, a youth movement 
that was created by Thomas Sankara. Sams’K is hence also a prominent follower of Sankarist 
ideas. At Oméga FM he often spoke out against the regime of Comaporé. His car was set on 
fire in 2007, after he had spoken out for more freedom of speech and the press, and for justice 
for Norbert Zongo.  
 Smockey, a hip-hop musician, rapper and activist is the son of a French woman and a 
Burkinabè man, and lived in France until 2001. Upon his return to Burkina he started his own 
studio Abazon. Just as Sams’K, Smockey heavily opposed Compaoré’s regime which was 
clearly noticeable and sometimes visible in his songs, videos and shows. Both Smockey and 
Sams’K already enjoyed a large audience of (young) Burkinabè who listened to their music, 
on their phones, via the radio (which they also listen on their phone), and by downloading the 
video clips and loading these on a USB-stick.  
 
 
Source: Still of the song “On est dans la rue” which Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah launched during the launch of 
the Balai Citoyen. In the song they sign/rap how they are on the streets to search for food (that is the minimum), , 
and to hold “them” (the political elite under guidance of Blaise Compaoré) accountable for impunity, corruption 
and high cost of living.  « On est dans la rue, par la rue, pour la rue, et consciente avec vous […] - on est dans 
la rue – juste avoir à manger – c’est le minimum – de la dignité et de la liberté – c’est le minimum ! » 
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  Next to Smockey and Sams’K, who mainly pushed the movement to become known 
amongst the youth and internationally, the Balai has around 15 prominent core members, who 
come together each week to discuss plans and the state of affairs – of Burkina, the Balai, and 
the world. These 15 members are lawyers, students, journalists, teachers, researchers and 
business people. Amongst those 15, there is one woman, F, who is a rock for many. All of 
them work for the Balai on a voluntary basis and dedicate most of their free time to the 
organisation of the movement. Now that it is rather quiet, the work load is relatively easy to 
carry. However, during the uprising, as well as during the period of transition when the Balai 
organised many – and I mean many – debates, demonstrations, marches, public events, and so 
on, I could see that the load was a heavy burden to carry. Many of them slept as little as three 
hours per night in order to keep up with the movement, as well as with their own work in 
order to make a living for themselves, or their families. Officially, the Balai Citoyen is a 
political grassroots movement – meaning a collective of people coming from an activist 
standpoint and from ‘the roots’ – i.e. regular people in society (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 
1). They call themselves a citizen movement: “We are the people and we are there for the 
people”, (Z, Balai Citoyen).  
  Social movements are informal networks created by a multiplicity of individuals, 
groups, and organizations, engaged in political or cultural conflicts on the basis of a shared 
collective identity (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p. 2). They can have various modes of 
collective action and a social movement should be seen as a movement of organizations, 
rather than as networks of independent actors. Within discussions on defining social 
movements, ‘new’ social movements arose that primarily focussed on cultural and social 
issues – such as human rights and the environmental justice movement – rather than being 
solely political, such as a the labour movement and the socialist movements in the late 19th 
century (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, 0. 137) . Adding to this mix is the recent analysis on 
hybrid social movements in Africa40 by de Waal & Ibreck (2013). They argue that 
contemporary social movements in Africa characteristically take different forms which are 
shaped by their political-economic context, which also has its effects on the transformative 
change that the movement might aim to achieve and can actually achieve (de Waal & Ibreck, 
2013, p. 304). They argue that social movements may initially emerge as spontaneous 
uprisings that demand change, whereas overtime they might become alternative patronage 
                                                          
40 They argue that North –and Sub-Saharan Africa should be treated together because they have much in 
common and help us to deeper understand the global phenomenon of social movements that (might be) 
interlinked through, amongst others, new ICTs.  
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systems competing for better positions and limited change within a fundamentally unaltered 
system. Social movement leaders might seek power for themselves or align themselves with 
the politicians they tried to replace. Della Porta and Diani (2006, p. 148) argues that 
organizations are very important in the organization of collective action and a social 
movement because they act as a powerful sources of identity for a movement’s constituency, 
and ‘bystander’ public. No matter how aware people may be of the complexity and 
heterogeneity of a movement, its public perception is likely to be associated with the most 
conspicuous characters. De Waal & Ibreck (2013, p. 319) identify hybrid social movements as 
movements that operate within a hybrid political order, and urge that movements need to be 
defined according to their actual socio-political structure.  
  Following the discussion from above, I would argue that the Balai Citoyen in the 
growth, outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings has grown into a social movement, 
existing of several organisations, and individuals that wanted to achieve the same goal: 
ousting Blaise Compaoré. They navigated the complex political spectrum to achieve that goal, 
arguing that this makes them hybrid as well, being able to adjust themselves to the context 
depending on where the movement had to go in order to achieve the goal. They were 
successful in achieving just that, but I have also encountered many stories where their 
followers – the people who joined them on the streets – did not really understand what they 
were all about and who was managing who. Nevertheless, the Balai Citoyen managed to 
attach many ‘floating’ people who wanted to join the action, but did not see themselves as a 
political actor, or being part of a movement per se. Even though some might not have 
understood who the Balai is and where they came from, I would argue that they did manage 
to mobilize huge crowds, whether this was through music, concerts, political debates or 
Facebook discussions. My friend, Aziz, described this to me in a perfect way: “You 
know…I’m not political, and those guys from the Balai Citoyen are not political either. Oh 
well, I don’t know actually… You know them right? Who are they even? Ha! But, all jokes 
aside, when I heard there were demonstrations and barricades on the streets to kick that 
bastard out, I was the first to be there! What else do I have to do all day? Wait until he ruins 
our economy even more, making sure that all we can do is roams the streets for food!  [of 
course, I see a clear reference here to the song “On est dans la rue”, but you can never know 
for sure how much Aziz has taken over this phrase from a song]. The Balai opened up a 
moment, in which we could all join. So we did.  What do I have to lose? My life?”      
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Source: AFP. In the picture: Smockey and Sams’K Le Jah, amongst others, in a march against the RSP, on 
September 16th, 2015.     
 
Planning a revolution41 
As became evident from Aziz’ statement mentioned above, not everybody understood who 
the Balai was and who was actually behind them. Moreover, a big part of the people on the 
streets were young guys, such as Aziz, who had nothing to lose. They were not there based on 
ideological conviction or political ideals, but because they were fed-up. And, I would argue, 
also because this moment in Burkina Faso’s history also proved to be a great way to express 
years of build-up anger against a regime that did not see them.  
  In any case, because of its rapid growth but lack of organizational structures and clear 
leadership, the Balai has seen its fair share of criticism over the short years of their existence 
and has changed form and formation several times, adjusting to their context. Since they 
began in 2013, they have lost many people who initially joined their movement. Some later on 
chose to start their own movement, and some did not trust them anymore after the uprising of 
2014 or even before they started. After a few months, and even while I was friends with some 
people from the Balai, I noticed that I too, did not fully grasp the roots of this important 
                                                          
41 Much, if not all, of my understanding of the course of this ‘planning’ stems from interviews with M and B.  
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movement that was dubbed by many as the ones playing a leading role in the 2014 uprising. 
Luckily, I came across two men who could find the time to explain to me in detail how they 
thought that the birth of the Balai had contributed, amongst others, to the bigger movement 
that carried the popular uprising and the collective anger against Compaoré’s regime. These 
two were M, a former member of the Balai and a member of the transitional government at 
the time, and B, a researcher and lecturer at Université de Ouagadougou. 
In the course of the years it has become a characteristic of the Burkinabè 
demonstrations that it largely surpasses organised structures and the ‘intellectuals’ (Chouli, 
2015, p. 148). She mentioned that a public space for opposition emerged where everybody 
who was looking for a way to express their discontent could take part, whether it was in a 
rural or urban zone and about corruption or land-rights, and that this discontent was often a 
reason for organised or spontaneous mobilisation. This underlines the notions of Hagberg 
(2002) and Engels (2015) that describe a continuous revolutionary flame within Burkina Faso 
since the death of Norbert Zongo, or maybe even Sankara. Chouli (2015) mentions that the 
student uprisings of 2011, after the murder on Julien Zongo (not directly related to Norbert 
Zongo), already indicated a ‘quasi-insurrection’. As Hagberg (2002) sees the murder on 
Norbert Zongo in the 90’s as a turning point, Chouli (2015) states that the student protests of 
2011 were the turning point in the battle against impunity and the start of popular mobilisation 
in movements. Whichever moment or turning point you choose, it is evident that there was a 
smouldering revolutionary flame in Burkina, waiting for the right moment to be lit.  
 To these above mentioned turning points, I would like to add a third, as discussed by 
M and B. They explain that after the start of the Jasmine Revolution in Tunisia in 2010 and 
YouTube videos were circulating on Facebook and Twitter, they decided it was time to start 
organizing something like that in Burkina as well. They, as some others, were part of a think-
thank-like collective called CADRE (Cadre de Réflexion et d’Actions Démocratiques). As B 
states: “We understood very well the power of social media and also understood that we, as 
elites working at the university and such, were not the ones who were going to organize a 
revolution. We needed everybody on board and we needed everybody to understand what was 
at stake. Already back in 2010 we knew that Blaise Compaoré wanted to find a way to 
prolong his mandate, one way or another. Therefore, we saw the need to start planning the 
revolution. We needed to engage those who were not engaged; we needed to make use of all 
those young guys on the streets, jobless, with no perspectives. As a start, together with some 
younger guys who were already active on Facebook and shared our concerns, we started to 
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set up Facebook pages like ‘Débat Politique’. We shared YouTube videos on the uprisings in 
Tunisia and Egypt in these groups, and we kept feeding these groups with information about 
Blaise his rule of impunity and injustice over the years. We shared memories of how Zongo’s 
and Sankara’s cases were still not opened, and how we saw how he was planning to prolong 
his mandate”. [….] “Then! It happened…..”  In July 2013, Blaise Compaoré tried to establish 
a new Senate which could prolong his mandate for another five years. On the 28th of July, 
thousands of people hit the streets of Ouagadougou and Bobo-Dioulasso to condemn this 
establishment. Zephirin Diabré, the opposition leader and organiser of the protest, as well as 
the Balai Citoyen (very recently established) were happily surprised with the massive turnout.  
These protests were accompanied by massive discussions on Facebook and the birth of more 
Facebook-groups such as “Blaise Degage”, “Ça suffit!”, and “Non au referendum”. The birth 
and importance of these Facebook groups and the discussions they carried was underlined by 
almost all my informants and interviewees.    
  Next to the discussions that CADRE had within their collective, this period of turmoil 
from 2010 onwards consisted of several meetings with people from small grassroots 
movements, artists, trade unionists, businessmen, movement entrepreneurs42 and journalists 
who decided “it was time to build support for a movement that could mobilize those 
thousands of young Burkinabè who had no interest in politics what so ever. Because ‘Blaise 
was not their leader’, or ‘things would never change’”, states M, while we were having lunch 
at the newly established CNT in May 2015. M explains how several of these individuals got 
together to establish a movement. Amongst them were M himself, Valère Somé (an academic 
and former ally of Sankara), as well as Smockey. And you guessed it: the Balai Citoyen was 
born. The start of the Balai, as I understand it from M’s explanation, was thus not necessarily 
a grassroots citizen movement, although it grew into becoming a social movement with the 
goal to oust Blaise Compaoré and instigate change after 27 years. This loose organisation, 
without clear leadership structures, that grew into the face of the Burkinabè revolution did 
prove difficult at times.   
 HD, a businessman and a former member of the Balai told me that he already started 
to feel the tensions rise around the end of 2013. People within the movement started to 
establish some forms of mistrust amongst each other, since people were not really sure exactly 
“how political everybody was and where the movement was heading to”. HD describes that 
                                                          
42 A term that stems from social movement theory that refers to individuals who launch social movements or 
some form of collective action (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013, p. 165).  
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‘some’ accused ‘others’ of having strong ties to the (very) recently set up MPP (January 
2014). With all these rumours going on, HD, SC, M and some others decided to leave the 
Balai. Some decided to join other movements, whereas others decided that it would have been 
best to analyse politics on the down-low, through for example CADRE, rather than being 
highly active in a very visible movement. When I asked the opinion about this split from the 
‘remaining’ Balai, the ones that I got to know, I immediately felt that this was a topic that 
they do not like to discuss, and C explained that “they are the ones that wanted to leave, we 
did not force anything”. Case closed. After this split, which has been much discussed on 
Facebook but had hardly been picked up by (inter)national media at that time, the questions 
remained to the public: where does the Balai get its funding from? Do they have political ties, 
and if yes, to whom? Can they be trusted? Do they have another incentive than that they 
portray?   
  As M explains, these tensions within the Balai could partly be explained because of 
the birth of a new political party in the beginning of 2014: the Movement pour le Peuple et le 
Progrès: MPP. Its three big men all belonged to the former regime. Roch Kaboré, a former 
banker, served as president of the National Assembly, prime minister and CDP chairman; 
Salif Diallo also held several prestigious portfolios, and Simon Compaoré, the former mayor 
of Ouagadougou. Together they decided to quit the party of Compaoré and set up a new one. 
They claim that their break with Compaoré was triggered by his plan to change the 
constitution, of which Kaboré had been openly critical for a long time. Kaboré, Diallo and 
Compaoré (Simon, no family of Blaise) announced their resignation from the CDP in January 
2014. The CDP had been reduced to a ‘business for friends’, they wrote. The ‘democratic 
commitments’ of the party, and the ‘dearly-won victories of its tireless activists’ had been 
squandered. This hardly came as a revelation. R explains that “it was more striking that it 
took them so long to come to this conclusion”. They took 72 prominent CDP party members 
with them to form the MPP, dealing a heavy blow to Compaoré’s grip on power. In the 
months that followed, they joined the protests against their former boss. But, as M explained, 
“the MPP did put a lot of people on edge. We did not really know what they were up to and 
had to be careful with their moves. It was evident that they, too, did not want to lose their 
position at the highest posts of Burkinabè politics, they did it sneaky and they succeeded to 
change the discourse around them. Sneaky, but politically very well done”. This ‘sneaky’ way 
of the MPP can explain why some members of the newly established Balai Citoyen were a bit 
cautious of who had political ties. The Balai deliberately wanted to stay a-political, not being 
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tied to any political party (although many of them are openly Sankarists), and hence some 
accusations of them being tied to the MPP, evidently, caused tensions within the movement.  
  Nevertheless, these rising tensions within Burkina Faso contributed to the awareness 
around the necessity to oust Compaoré from power and the growing support among citizens to 
engage in social movements, as well as in demonstrations and protests on the streets.  
 
“We can do this too!” 
Next to the above mentioned social and political shifts that occurred in Burkina before the 
uprising in 2014, it must also not be forgotten that, as de Waal & Ibreck (2013) rightfully 
mention, Burkina Faso was not excluded from the tensions that happened outside of the 
country. Globalisation enables new ICTs and new forms of communication, which leads to 
increasing awareness and public imaginary.43 The Arab Spring was not the only political 
uprising in the region that triggered the feeling of “we can do this too” among the Burkinabè. 
At that time (and still) there is a lot going on concerning political unrest and political 
discussions that are being held online, throughout the region. One of the main components of 
all the political unrests was that people massively shared wrong-doings by the army and 
police during demonstrations, for example, via social media such as Facebook, Twitter and 
YouTube, just as what happened during the Arab Spring. The fact that there were several 
other citizen-led social movements addressing the wrong-doings and extensive periods of rule 
by their leaders in Africa helped to create a certain sense of ‘brotherhood’. The Balai often 
organised marches that addressed their solidarity with their brothers from other movements 
such as Filimbi (Democratic Republic of the Congo – DRC) and Y’en a Marre (Senegal). 
Moreover, when there is news that somewhere, somehow, a leader is trying to unlawfully 
extend its mandate or the elections, they again hit the streets to show solidarity with their 
‘brothers’, for example for Burundi (2015) and Gambia (2016).  
  For many, not just for the Burkinabè and the Balai Citoyen, the movement Y’en a 
marre from Senegal offered as an example on how to mobilise people for massive 
demonstrations, also by the means of new ICTs (Facebook, SMS, Twitter, and YouTube). 
Y’en a marre was one of the movements that successfully made sure that their former 
president stepped down, after they collectively took the streets to demand his departure in 
                                                          
43 In my personal opinion, I argue that this public imaginary is also one of the reasons why international media 
like to take the stance that the Balai Citoyen was the one that carried the popular uprising, as well as putting 
Smockey and Sams’K at the forefront of this movement. The Balai chose for publicity and for operating in this 
momentum given to them – creating a public image, also for those outside of Burkina, which might not always 
have been in favour for those in Burkina Faso per se.  
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2013. As stated by Tall, Pommerolle and Cahen (2015), new ICTs made sure that uprising 
elsewhere could be relayed and interpreted. They shared their uprisings throughout social 
media – which created another reason for the Burkinabè to say: “We can do this too!”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Pictures taken by F. Dragstra: a meeting of Filimbi (the counterpart of the Balai Citoyen), Y’en a 
marre, (their Senegalese counterpart) and the Balai Citoyen during the Ciné Droit Libre festival in June 2015.  
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4. « La lutte continue »  
As became evident in the aforementioned, the Balai Citoyen was able to mobilise people 
because of a collective action frame based on the transcending necessity to oust Blaise 
Compaoré from power and end his long-lasting rule in which impunity and injustice ruled and 
freedom of expression was often undermined – they were tired of it all. Moreover the Balai 
shows how they adjusted to the changes within Burkina Faso, by which they relied on a cross 
between social media-based networks and a more traditional way of social movement 
organisations (de Waal & Ibreck, 2013). Rennick (2013) developed a framework on how 
social media’s role in uprisings can be understood. In her framework she distinguishes a pre-
mobilisation phase and a collective action phase. Before the emergence of the collective 
action phase, the pre-mobilisation phase allows for social media (as a tool) to enlarge the 
public sphere to new non-political actors and permits the sharing of grievances through which 
broadly shared frames and ideas on issues (or memories) can emerge. The collective action 
phase showcases the phase where social movements (as collectives) act towards achieving 
that change that they have established through these collective action frames. In these phases, 
it is important to mention that she too, recognizes how connective action, as described by 
Bennett and Segerger (2013), and the use of new ICTs to communicate these messages 
ensures rapid mobilisation but lacks the need to bind people to the ideology of the movement 
(if there was any to begin with). By following the pre-mobilisation phase and the collective 
action phase, I will describe the role of new ICTs in the events of October 2014 and 
September 2015 in Burkina Faso.  
 
« Les dix jours qui ont fait chuter Blaise Compaoré » 
Semfilms made a movie with the title “the ten days that made Blaise Compaoré fall”, in which 
they follow the course of the ‘ten-day revolution’, or the popular uprising in October 2014. 
Even though many international media and blogs talk about the final two days in which the 
uprising reached its boiling-point, the 30th and the 31st of October, the build-up to the fall of 
Blaise Compaoré is just as important. As mentioned in the introduction, mobile phone –and 
social media use are two of the fastest growing telecommunications in Burkina Faso. 
Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 3, the think-thank CADRE saw the growing number of 
people that were connected to social networks as a perfect opportunity to start raising political 
awareness. In order to create awareness, the Balai and other movements shared the feelings 
that many others had trough social media. Being “tired of it all”, and the everlasting open 
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cases of the death of Thomas Sankara, Dabo Boukary and Norbert Zongo, the announcement 
of the referendum for another mandate of Blaise Compaoré and the organisation of public 
debates at universities and organising large public demonstrations: almost all of these 
discussions were held online, as well as offline. Where did the discussion start? And how can 
we check? I argue that this might be an impossible task. However, what is evident is that 
Facebook, Twitter and blogs were used by both a-political as well as politically active people 
to express their voices and that the online and offline debates mutually influenced each other.  
However, even though people in the bigger cities were relatively active online, people did not 
really use it yet for big political discussions, states B, a member of CADRE. Nevertheless, 
when we saw what happened in Tunisia [the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2010], we 
decided it was time to see what these discussion groups could do in Burkina. We wanted to 
educate, raise awareness and start a discussion. Not only did the rise of public Facebook 
groups in which people could express their opinion, as discussed above lead up to the 
momentum of the 30th and the 31st of October, 2014. Semfilms deliberately speaks of the ‘ten 
days that led to the fall of Blaise Compaoré’, in which they address the 21st until the 31st of 
October. These were the days in which the tensions that built over the years led to the 
Burkinabè revolution of October 2014.  
  On October 21st, one of the councillors of the ‘ministres extraordinaire’ introduced the 
Bill that could amend the national Constitution, meaning in practice that Blaise Compaoré 
could go for another mandate. In order to amend Article 37 of the Constitution, all deputies 
had to vote in a referendum. Some of the opposition parties within the government 
immediately opposed this decision (they were already firmly against the decision to even hold 
a referendum for another mandate in the first place), and called this a “constitutional coup” 
and asked for massive “civil disobedience” (Hagberg, Kibora, Ouattara & Konkobo, 2015, p. 
204). Within the days that followed, massive civil unrest occurred and thousands of people 
listened to the appel (summon, or calling) of the Balai Citoyen on Facebook, Radio Oméga 
(in the lead of Sams’K Le Jah), and the opposition parties, to hit the streets to condemn the 
referendum, to condemn Blaise Compaoré and to condemn the system that made these things 
possible. As R describes: “we were all waiting for this to happen, so I guess we were ready…. 
But when we heard the decision that the referendum would actually take place, we hoped for 
massive outreach, but did not expect this many people coming out. It really felt like the whole 
of Burkina was on the streets…. I even got phone calls of people from up-country to ask if it 
was worth it to travel down…. Of course I said yes! There was no backing out!” These 
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demonstrations led to the sharing of videos of the protests on social media and through mobile 
phones, as well as a lot of graffiti and tags on walls all throughout Ouagadougou. 44 These 
tags had phrases like: “Blaise Ebola”45, “Blaise Dégage”, “Non au referendum”, and “Ne 
touche pas à ma constitution”.  Of course, this is also a way of expressing discontent.  
 
 
Source:  “Blaise = Ebola” on a sign that is 
supposed to be there to ensure a cleaner 
Ouagadougou. Credit: AFP.    
 
 
 
 
 
Source: “Ebola vaut mieux que Blaise” – meaning that it would have been better to have Ebola than Blaise. 
Picture taken by Sophie Garcia/Hollandse Hoogte, during one of the demonstrations in Ouagadougou, October 
2014.   
                                                          
44 I have seen this in other cities throughout the country as well, but not as much as in Ouagadougou.  
45 This refers to the disease Ebola, since at the time of the Burkinabè revolution, Ebola took epidemic forms all 
over West Africa.   
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  On Monday October 27th, Le Collectif des Femmes pour la Défense de la Constitution 
called for a march against the modification of Article 37. It started off with several dozens of 
Ouagalais women that took the streets with their brooms and spatulas in the air to declare that 
they, too, would join ‘the week of civil disobedience’. As Hagberg, Kibora, Ouattara and 
Konkobo (2015, p. 205) mention, “When the women go out, then, it will be the end of Blaise”.  
In addition to this, I have spoken to many women who said that they “even went as far as not 
having sex with their husbands and boyfriends until Blaise would leave” (CE and N said this 
while laughing loudly). In the course of the day many more women joined, not only in 
Ouagadougou, but in all major cities in the country. This march was symbolic in the ten days 
that led to the fall of Blaise Compaoré, because, as T mentions, “this had never, and I mean 
never, happened in the history of revolutions, demonstrations and uprisings in Burkina, that 
this many women condemned their leaders, left the house, and said something about politics. 
It was significant in our citizen battle against Blaise and it was significant in the battle that 
we have as women in general. We are political. Never, ever, try and touch my rights and my 
Constitution”. CE underlines this and states how important it is, also for younger girls to see 
that their mothers and grandmothers joined the protest as well. She is cited in the article by 
Hagberg, Kibora, Ouattara and Konkobo (2015, p. 207): “I was so proud to see that many of 
these women were mothers and grandmothers of a certain age who came out for their people, 
for their children because it had become too much. Around 4 PM we started walking and 
waving our spatulas and chanting phrases like: 'don’t touch my Constitution’”.
 
Source: March of the Spatulas, October 27th, 2014. Credit: © Burkina24.  
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 On October 28th, the mobilization was historical. The Balai, CAR (Collectif Anti-
Referendum), ‘le Front de Résistance Citoyenne’, ‘Ça suffit !’, ‘REPERE’, ‘Deux heures pour 
nous, deux heures pour l’Afrique’, the trade unions, and the student unions all massively 
called for ‘civil disobedience’ through Facebook, SMS and WhatsApp for the 28th. I 
remember C singing a tune to “Ain’t no stopping us now”46 with a heavy French accent when 
he talked about this day, with a smile from ear-to-ear. The day started early in the morning 
when people gathered on the Place de la Nation, after which they would demonstrate all day. 
The radio, especially Radio Oméga, was highly active in giving people minute by minute 
updates. People listed to the radio on portable radios or on their mobile phones and would 
inform others. Moreover, the Balai and other movements made use of Facebook to give up to 
date information about police barricades and army traps. Of course, they would use SMS to 
send fast information when needed to. But most of all, as R mentions: “we needed to make 
sure where everybody was and understand how the situation was developing at Kosyam and 
the National Assembly. We therefore needed people on the streets, people that kept us updated 
and people that circulated information. We didn’t really make a deal about who did what and 
why, but it happened to emerge naturally. Sharing information, also to keep people safe, 
became like a second nature”.    
  After the demonstrations of the 28th and 29th, when even more people joined, things 
started to get tricky. On the 29th, the debate started to rise on Facebook between politicians 
and citizens: was the government stopping the referendum, and would they stop this non-
sense (Hagberg, Kibora, Ouattara & Konkobo, 2015)? Blaise and his consorts knew that they 
could not hold the situation much longer; however, voting day (for the referendum) was 
almost there. Therefore, in order to ensure stability and in a final attempt to maintain control, 
Blaise shut down the Internet on the 29th and the 30th. This, which could have been expected, 
caused massive outrage, and made the Burkinabè even more determined to oust Compaoré 
from power. “The damage was already done….. What was he thinking?”, stated C.  
  On the 30th of October, the day of the vote, people again massively gather around 
the Place de la Nation and on Avenue Kwame N’Krumah in the centre of Ouagadougou 
where people together marched towards the National Assembly, where the vote would be 
held. Radio Oméga kept people updated on every second of the procedure – when would the 
ministers leave the hotel they stayed in, when would the vote actually be placed. But, all 
                                                          
46 A Song by McFadden and Whitehead, which can be found here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DY0tsKCB4lc 
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attempts of the army and the police aside, around 9.20hr in the morning of the 30th, a massive 
angry crowd of Burkinabè overtook the National Assembly, even before the ministers could 
reach it, and burned it down. They burned down all paper work, the cars that were still parked 
in front, broke windows, and danced on tables. This was their victory. The victory of a people. 
Amongst those that celebrated the victory of a burned down assembly, which felt like they 
‘defeated’ Compaoré, were the leaders of the opposition parties. The burning of the Assembly 
happened at the same time that protesters burned down (some of) the (many) houses of Simon 
Compaoré and his wife, of Blaise Compaoré and his wife Chantal, and the headquarters of the 
CDP, and the national radio and television stations (RTB – Radio, Télévision, Burkinabè) . In 
Bobo-Dioulasso, where protests were also happening at the same time, they burned down 
Hôtel de Ville (City Hall).  
  
Source: the aftermath of October 30th, a burned down National Assembly. 
 
  As the day begins to reach its end, Zéphirin Diabré, the leader of the opposition 
parties, spoke on the radio to announce that there were around a dozen people killed in the 
demonstrations. These numbers, however, did not stop the Burkinabè to continue to pressurize 
Blaise to leave – since he did not resign yet. Protesters marched up to Kosyam, where they, 
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again, were greeted by the army. However, three representatives of the protesters managed to 
meet the president to demand for his resignation (Hagberg, Kibora, Ouattara & Konkobo, 
2015, p. 211). After these talks, Blaise Compaoré called for calm and dialogue by an 
announcement on Canal 3, a TV channel seen as partisan to the opposition by the ruling elite, 
which he had to use because the RTB was out of service. CE states, while laughing cynically, 
that when he started with “‘Chèrs compatriot Burkinabès’ he already sold himself out. “He 
had nothing left! Who did he call his ‘chèrs’, we were no longer his citizens and he was no 
longer one of us. It was over. Although he did not realise it yet”.  
  Needless to say, on the 31st of October demonstrations continued. People did not 
agree with Blaise his suggestion to ‘stay calm and enter in dialogue’. People again gathered 
around Place the la Nation, which they now dubbed Place de la Revolution, as it was called in 
the days of Sankara’s rule. The protesters in the streets gave Blaise an ultimatum: ‘you have 
12 hours to resign, or else…’ At this stage of the popular uprising, the ones who were 
supposed to keep the ‘crowds’ (if you could even call them crowds) in order, the police, the 
army, and all other forces were gone. The political parties did not have a plan that could have 
foreseen these massive uprisings, as well as the course of the ten days. Therefore, they left the 
course of how the demonstrations should be organized to the biggest movements and citizen 
collectives. The social movements kept putting the pressure on the government forces and 
building, which resulted in, in the end, the resignation of Blaise Compaoré. In the course of 
the day, he signed and handed in his letter of resignation. Radio Oméga, who was present at 
all major ‘hotspots’ in town, immediately shared this news through SMS, Facebook, and their 
radio show, resulting in cheering crowds that celebrated their victory on the streets, two 
minutes after Blaise had signed – an immediate victory dance on the streets.  
  In the course of the 31st, people would share videos of a convoy of big military 
government vehicles that transported Blaise Compaoré to Ivory Coast. The man who is 
filming the convoy which passed his small maquis laughs out loud and says: “Bye bye 
Blaise!” On the 1st of November 2014, the Balai, other movements and the opposition parties 
called for operation “mana-mana”.47 This message was spread, once again, through Facebook, 
and led to, again, a huge turnout of people that started to clean the streets, sweeping their 
brooms. Ouagadougou went ‘back to normal’, after an uprising, led and won by the people.    
                                                          
47 “Mana-mana” means ‘to clean’ in Dioula. During the time of Thomas Sankara it was an expression to call all 
citizens to regularly clean their neighbourhood and their ‘life’.  
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Source: Picture by F. Dragstra, 29 June, 2015. Proud members of the Balai Citoyen, of which many of them 
have helped with the realisation of the film by Semfilms: “Une Révolution Africaine: Les dix jours qui ont fait 
chuter Blaise Compaoré”.  
 
  C, V, R and Smockey once explained to me on a night in June, how “it was our 
obligation to burn the Assembly, to block roads and to have total civil disobedience, whilst 
being non-violent towards people. We did not want to harm anyone. All we wanted is to give a 
message to those in power and all that represented the former regime [the National 
Assembly]. Burning down the institution in which they suppressed us for us may have 
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represented the tipping-point of our anger. We were done with their ‘bullshit’”.  C explained 
to me, each time we passed the burned down National Assembly, which is situated on one of 
the main roads in Ouagadougou on which many ministries, radio stations and the University is 
situated, that “the Balai Citoyen has argued that the burned down National Assembly was to 
be made into a museum and that behind this, we should build the new National Assembly. 
Meaning that, every time members of parliament have to go to work, they will always 
remember that they work for the people”.  
 
Source: Illustration made by Yetiz, (Barré). Illustration was made to accompany an article on the Burkinabè 
popular uprising of October 2014: http://barremag.info/Le-president-Compaore-a-pris-un  
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Period of transition 
After the resignation of Compaoré on October 31st, 2014, army chief Isaac Zida ‘offered’ to 
become head of state, and later on agreed to share power with a veteran Compaoré diplomat, 
Michel Kafando. The transitional government existed of a mix of civil society representatives, 
the army (who claimed six posts, amongst which Communications and Defence), and a 
medley of political parties. The period of transition was one of lots of discussion, open 
debates and political reform; however, there was also a lot of contestation and instability, 
waiting to pop-up when somebody made a wrong move. Smockey declared in an interview 
with the BCC, right after Compaoré fled the country that: “all we want is that the army will 
lead us, as soon as possible, towards democratic, free and transparent elections. They gave us 
their word, and we think that we can at least give them a little bit of confidence, although we 
will stay hyper-vigilant”, (“Si je restais, je serais une cadaver”, 2014).  
  It was during this period that I did my field work for this research making it an 
interesting environment to do research in. Little did I know was that I was in the middle of 
two momenta that could show the power of rapid mobilisation through new ICTs – the coup 
d’état. Even though this period was rather tense, and the RSP had attempted to overthrow the 
transition government several times already – as described in the introduction – I, and many 
others with me, were maybe naively hoping for a subtle transition towards the elections.  
A, a member of the transition government and one of the leaders of another movement, Ça 
suffit!, explained to me when I bumped into him at the CNT while I was waiting for my 
appointment with M that: “I am happy that his whole period of uncertainty is over. I mean, it 
was good. And I’m happy that all worked out the way it did. But there was much rivalry 
between movements…people did not meet expectations, did not hold their promises. The old 
system – whether this was within the old political party or on the market – was filled with 
mistrust. I hope we can fix that. That people trust each other again. That is what we try to do 
here…. Talk talk talk – but at least we talk and we don’t fight”. But, right as he walked away, 
he whispered: “But, you know what Fiona, as soon as we need to, we now know how to kick 
them out!” In a period filled with hope and high on adrenaline of the fall of Compaoré, the 
Burkinabè tried to talk their way out of 27 years of doing politics ‘the old way’ – “just 
knowing who to know and then knowing how to use your know-how”, (R, Balai Citoyen).  
  The main thing that I want to address in this sub-chapter is the deception that Aziz 
described to me one night in June. We have had many discussions about the Balai and what 
they had done to create momentum during the uprisings. I was – almost always – very eager 
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to learn more about what they had to say, which I also followed daily on Facebook. I would 
invite Aziz (and other friends) to join me for a debate or a panel discussion that the Balai 
would have organized to discuss inclusive elections, the continuation of the movement, or 
another ‘political’ subject, that for me indicated that the debating sphere was alive and 
kicking. However, after a while I noticed that Aziz and some other friends started to distance 
themselves from the political debate and especially the Balai. They would say, smirking: 
“How are things with your friends in politics?” In June, I asked Aziz why he was being a bit 
taken aback with the approach of the Balai and why he now downgraded one of the 
movements which he used to talk highly of. He explained the following: “I actually expected 
more from them. That Smockey guy probably just wants to make money. Sams’K is travelling 
and we hardly see him in Burkina. All those others that you hang out with, they are not in 
touch with those that fought with them on the streets. They let us down. I know some of my 
friends wanted them, or maybe expected them to go into politics – to become a political party 
for the youth, that could break that cycle of our old system, but they didn’t. I don’t know what 
I want them to do – I understand that they want to stay ‘a-political’, but they are not! They 
are dining with the devil, probably, and they are not with us. Sometimes… Yes. Sometimes, I 
feel used. I fought for my life, and now? They go to their wives in France, US, and we stay. 
We clean up the streets that we fought on together”.   
  Aziz’ his confession on his own deception of ‘what to do next’- after this big 
momentum where everybody was together to reach that goal – are in line with something that 
de Waal and Ibreck (2013) also touch upon. First of all, we cannot exclude the importance of 
organisations that carry a collective identity and that spirit of disciplined selflessness in the 
long-lasting, durable effects that a social movement might be able to create. Meaning that new 
ICTs are less important than existing or to-be-established social relations to which people feel 
like they (can) belong, in which they feel safe and wherein leaders of social movements know 
which role they (want) to play, as well as that they are capable of analysing the opportunities, 
limitations and the aftermaths of collective mobilisation. New ICTs (can) play a major role in 
both the sharing of information and mobilisation, as well as in the creation of a collective 
identity. I would argue that the Balai Citoyen , as a citizen movement as they call themselves, 
have failed in letting people believe in their values after their successful mobilisation within 
the period of transition, they need to start building trust again.  
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The failed coup d’état of September 201548 
A national vote was planned for November 2015, but before that could happen, the Burkinabè 
had to mobilize once more against an attempted coup. On the 16th of September, members of 
the RSP detained Kafando and Zida during a cabinet meeting at Kosyam. The next day, 
the RSP announced that the borders had been sealed and that veteran Compaoré loyalist 
Gilbert Diendéré, who had recently been ousted as RSP commander, would assume the 
presidency until ‘inclusive and peaceful’ elections could be held. C explains to me over 
Facebook, while I am in Italy and he is in Ivory Coast, that, probably, “much of the RSP’s 
anger was directed towards Zida, Diendéré’s former deputy: Diendéré had wrongly 
calculated that Zida would be the instrument by which he could get the transitional 
government to do his bidding. However, Zida turned out to have a mind of his own and began 
arguing for the RSP to be dismantled. The coup was, first and foremost, a settling of scores 
between Zida and his former comrades-in-arms, who felt betrayed by their old second-in-
command”. 
  Soldiers forced Radio Oméga off the air and set the cars of its journalists alight; they 
also tried to shut down the Internet, in which they failed. Since Radio Oméga played a vital 
role during the uprisings in 2014, it seemed that they were being punished for its critique of 
the RSP and support for the protesters. Moreover, Smockey’s studio Abazon was attacked with 
rocket-propelled grenades in which his entire studio was destroyed. This coup showed, very 
clearly this time, the power of new ICTs in how fast they can mobilize. Even though tensions 
were felt throughout the period of political transition, and people were keeping a watchful 
eye, the coup did somehow happen at an unexpected moment, when most of people’s 
attention was focused on ensuring safe and peaceful elections. During the RSP’s attempted 
grab of power in which they terrorized the streets of Ouagadougou, 20 people died, more than 
in the ten days of October 2014. More than 250 people got injured and most of all, the 
Burkinabè (at least the ones that I know) were furious.  
  After massive protest and some peace negotiations, the coup failed, not because of 
international intervention - though Benin’s president Yayi Boni and his Senegalese 
counterpart Macky Sall flew in to mediate on behalf of ECOWAS - but because it faced an 
immediate popular backlash. This time, the protest boards read: ‘The soldiers have 
confiscated our revolution’.  Barricades were constructed, and the trade unions called an 
                                                          
48 Almost all of my understanding of the coup d’état stems from constant informal talks on Facebook-chat with 
C and M.  
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indefinite general strike. There had already been many demands for the dissolution of 
the RSP, whose soldiers were accused of killing protesters in cold blood in 2014. The generals 
of the regular army initially hesitated to oppose the coup, but came under intense pressure 
from junior officers to take a stand. Diendéré was forced to back down and has now been 
charged with several offences, including murder, while the RSP has been disbanded.  
 
Source: Massive protests in Ouagadougou, where protesters hold signs saying ‘the military has confiscated our 
revolution’. Photo credit: Public Facebook page of ‘Basic Soul’.   
 
Source: Sia Kambou/AFP/Getty Images. The face of Thomas Sankara on a demonstrator’s T-shirt during a 
recent protest against the military coup on 18 September. 
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Source: SIA KAMBOU/AFP/Getty Images. Smoke comes from tires set on fire by demonstrators in the 
Tampouy, Ouagadougou, during a protest against on the 21st of September, 2015, two days after the coup d’état.  
 
Elections! And now what? 
Even before the actual elections, the Balai set up a campaign to ensure awareness around 
election fraud, such as messing with votes, vote-buying and bribing by government officials 
and the police. Therefore they organised: “Je vote et je reste” (I vote and I stay). This 
campaign centred on making sure that people would linger around voting stations to make 
sure that nothing unordinary would happen, and if something would be suspicious, they could 
send an SMS or share a picture on Facebook, to alarm the Balai. The campaign flyer below 
explains the process best. Although the idea was good, awareness, and ensuring peaceful 
elections, many people were critical. E stated that this “made it weird. It was as if this would 
even ensure more mistrust amongst people. And what would all those people do around the 
voting stations? Don’t they have a job to go to? And does this not lead to unrest around the 
voting stations?” I argue these are valid concerns, but, in the end, the campaign went well, 
and there no real incidents on Election Day.  Thus, on the 29th of November 2015 the 
elections were held and Roch Kaboré of the MPP became Burkina Faso’s new president, with 
53.5% of the vote on a 60% turnout. Burkina hence had had its first ‘democratic’, ‘free’ and 
‘peaceful’ elections since 27 years.   
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Source: Facebook page of the Balai Citoyen. The flyer of the campaign “Je vote et je reste”.  
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  As mentioned before, Kaboré, Salif Diallo and Simon Compaoré had been part of 
Compaoré’s inner circle until right before the wildfire of the uprising kicked in. ‘We have 
dined with the devil,’ Diallo said when asked about the MPP’s connections with the old 
regime at a press conference a few weeks before the 2015 election. ‘But we ourselves are not 
the devil. We had very long forks.’ Another journalist asked him specifically about a recent 
controversy. Valère Somé, had published a book charging Diallo with complicity in acts of 
torture on himself and other prisoners. It was not the first time Diallo had faced such 
allegations: the president of the General Union of Burkinabè Students (UGEB) had previously 
accused him of being involved in the arrest of Dabo Boukary. Another question mark hovers 
over the role of Diallo and Kaboré in the assassination of Sankara: Diallo was with Compaoré 
on the day it happened. Diallo naturally denied everything. The real question, he insisted, was 
how much Somé had been paid to write such ‘insanities’; it was best not to pay any attention 
to a man who deserved the ‘Nobel Prize for lying’. 
  Whatever baggage he may have been carrying from the past, Kaboré’s status as a 
former prime minister carried weight with the voters when they went to the polls in November 
2015: he outpolled his nearest rival Zéphirin Diabré, the opposition leader before and during 
the uprisings, in every province except Nahouri and Boulgou. The triple bill of Kaboré, Diallo 
and Simon Compaoré helped the MPP appeal to different parts of the country; Diallo is from 
the north, where the party did particularly well. Like those of its rivals, the MPP’s campaign 
focused on themes of justice and the struggle against poverty, although the techniques it used 
were strongly reminiscent of CDP methods - big concert-rallies, with the distribution of 
money and sacks of rice to the poor.  
  If the roots of the old regime remain intact, what happened to the plant itself? After the 
French helped Compaoré flee to Ivory Coast, he has remained in exile since, evading an 
international arrest warrant. He recently became an Ivorian citizen in order to stave off the 
threat of extradition. The Abidjan villa where Blaise and Chantal live belongs to the Ivorian 
Minister of Internal Affairs, Hamed Bakayoko, who also happens to be a good friend of Roch 
Kaboré. C stated in a phone call we had in June, 2016, “I will literally not be surprise when 
that devil of a rat will work his way up to Burkina’s political system again or that he still 
pulls the strings. I can still feel him sometimes, but we will not let him in”.  
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5. « Débat politique » 
   
  
  
  
 
 
Sources: A small selection out of many public Facebook groups 
and pages in which politics were discussed before and during the 
revolution, and of which some are still very active today.  All 
these pages can be found through Facebook and are open.  
   
 
 
 
Facebook groups 
Facebook has been a crucial medium for the people I studied as well as for how I did research 
myself. Before I went to Burkina Faso, I was closely following the news about the uprisings 
in October 2014 through, amongst others, Facebook. I followed the critical posts, calls for 
action and demonstrations, photos and videos that were being posted on a 100 (if not more) 
times-per-day basis. The same way in which I followed Burkina Faso in their momentum of 
political uprising, the Burkinabè had followed the beginning of the Arab Spring (the Jasmine 
Revolution) in Tunisia in 2010.  
 I, an economist and social researcher for Yam-Pukri, 49 S, a journalist from Sidwaya 
(one of the biggest newspapers in Burkina Faso), and P, founder of Faso.net,50 underline this 
                                                          
49 An ICT4Development organisation that works with and on new media. They also give people computer and 
social media training.  
50 Together with Burkina24.com one of the first news websites of Burkina Faso.  
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and state that since 2010 online and offline political debates really started. However, they also 
specifically state that we need to be weary of giving new ICTs and especially Facebook so 
much credit for organising a revolution and mobilising this many people. All three accentuate 
that there are many people with fake profiles roaming the web, ‘trolling’, 51 who are 
deliberately sharing wrong pieces of information and photos and videos. Moreover, they 
indicated that verifying information is very difficult, especially online. P stated that “people 
are not as well educated about what happens online and where information comes from, you 
even see illiterate people, sharing the most random information, typing words that don’t even 
make sense, whilst trying to engage in discussion. You can call this engagement, or you can 
call it non-influence. I don’t know what, you can decide”.  
  It is evident that Facebook was used both as a source of information, as well as a way 
to express ones voice. Moreover, in between all those ‘trolls’, there were also some prominent 
opinion makers – such as Basic Soul and R – of which people knew their affiliation to the 
Balai Citoyen. These Facebook groups and public profiles on which social movements and 
individuals could share their opinion on a certain topic also were in interaction with what 
would be organized, or happen ‘offline’. D, the founder of Deux heures pour nous, deux 
heures pour l’Afrique, a public debate group which found its roots at Université de 
Ouagadougou, explained this interactive approach to these Facebook groups very well. He 
states that: “Way before the popular uprising, as well as now [in the period of political 
tranisiotn, red.] we used the debates that were going on in the Facebook groups as topics for 
our debates that we would hold at our weekly open public debate at the university. Evidently, 
we would give live updates on the debate on Facebook – share videos, quotes and photos from 
the debate – which made sure that people who could not make it were included, or those who 
would be in Dori, or something, because they were interested in the topic, so that we could 
take their opinion with us while discussing the topics ‘live’.    
 
Sharing ideas, information and grievance: connective action 
Not only did the spread of information about the massive demonstrations on the streets 
influence young people’s decisions, it also had its effects on mobilising those who are, 
statistically speaking, ‘not connected’. T told me a story of how she was following the 
organisation of the demonstrations of the women, in the night of the 26th and in the early 
                                                          
51 Trolling is a form of cyber-bullying when people deliberately make fun of others online, give wrong pieces of 
information, or make people upset. They often do this anonymously.   
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morning on the 27th of October. On Facebook, many were sharing photos and videos of how 
massive crowds of women, with spatulas waving in the air, gathered all over Ouagadougou, 
Bobo-Dioulasso and Koudougou. T told her grandma of 74, who acted a bit annoyed. She 
said: “T, why do you say these things? If this was supposed to be true, I would have seen it on 
the television! And I haven’t seen anything this morning, so I don’t believe you”. T laughed 
and showed her grandma all the pictures and videos on her Facebook-feed. “I did not even 
blink my eyes, and she was gone, spatula and all! She took her moto, and she was off 
demonstrating a regime that she had supported all her life. It was amazing!”  
  As mentioned in the chapter above, especially Facebook was heavily used by the Balai 
Citoyen and other movements to inform people about their plans and how they wanted people 
to get involved. For many it was one of the only media they had to connect with thousands of 
likeminded people in a fast, effective and efficient way. Another way of disseminating 
information and mobilize people was through SMS and through independent radio stations, 
such as Radio Oméga. The Balai Citoyen only has a website since November 2015. Before, 
and hence also in the months leading up to and during the revolution, the only way of 
reaching out to the Balai, as well as for them to reach out to people that followed them closely 
to see what the next steps were, was through Facebook.  
  BB, a political analyst at Radio Oméga, explained this huge flow of information and 
urgency to end the regime of Compaoré as an “an online guerrilla-war”. He said that in the 
months, weeks but especially the days during the uprising, right before the referendum, 
people massively discussed, shared and researched Blaise’s “myriad of lies, impunity and rule 
of injustice”. BB states that “Even though we knew that some of the information that was put 
online was not always a 100% true – how can you even know? – it was the feeling of 
empowerment and massive feelings of actually planning on achieving something together that 
made it worthwhile. We discussed and discussed and shared and shared. We were so fed-
up!!” – He then shouted.  
  As stated in the discussion on literature, overwhelming feelings about the amount of 
information that is accessible, might lead to a perceived gap between having information and 
having knowledge, however, it seems as if people did not even care anymore if information 
was correct or not. They all felt and shared the necessity that Compaoré needed to leave. This, 
I argue, is also one of the reasons why debates and demonstrations, both online and offline 
and on the radio, were occupied by many different people in society. It was not just an 
97 
uprising of the youth, the elite or the ‘poor’, but of all Burkinabè who were tired and fed up 
with Blaise and his regime.    
 
Controlling the public debate    
Facebook has proven to be very useful for finding people, information and getting updates. 
However, when depending on it for information and mobilisation it also has its downsides. 
First of all, the portable devices52 on which new ICTs operate (SMS, Facebook, and Twitter) 
have a battery that needs to be charged and hence, you need electricity. Especially the 
smartphones won’t last longer than one or two days. Next to that, in order to receive, send and 
view the disseminated information, you need connection to the network provider which gives 
access to the SMS and caller servers and the Internet servers. Unfortunately, access to these 
two services, electricity and the network, often are or can be in control of the state. This may 
result in that the government decides to shut down the Internet providers, access to specific 
types of applications and websites (such as Facebook), or the network in total (this includes 
calling and SMS).  
  These types of drastic measures by the government have happened in the past few 
years in DRC, Burundi, Chad, Sudan, Gabon and Ethiopia to name only a few. Some called 
this an act of weakness and fear by the government: when they felt like they had no control 
over their people any more, they try to control them by shutting down a place for public 
expression. Even though this might be, indeed, an act of weakness or last resort by the 
government, it does often lead to two things. One, people do have less access to popular 
public opinion and fast means of mobilisation, which makes them more scattered and less 
threatening because it makes it more difficult to quickly mobilize large groups of people. 
However, and this leads to number two, sometimes this attempt of the government to control 
public unrest comes in too late. People are already mobilized, already so angry and already 
have a goal, that the malfunction of an Internet provider cannot and will not stop them from 
trying to reach their goal. In Burkina, the government decided to shut down the Internet 
providers when the revolution was already in full-swing for over a week. In their last attempt 
to get back control, people found another way. Even though the networks were overcrowded, 
people could still reach each other through SMS. “On those days the lines were often too 
                                                          
52 Devices like regular mobile phones that have the ability to call, send and receive text messages, and devices on 
which applications such as Facebook and Twitter can be downloaded such as smartphones, tablets and laptops. 
These devices are portable and have the ability to connect to Wi-Fi or make connection with the network 
provider in any other way (USB-stick with a SIM-card of a network provider (“Clé de connection”), mobile 
hotspots, VPN connection).  
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crowded to call each other, so we had to send texts (SMS) to tell each other where we were, 
where danger was (the army or other armed government forces), or where the next road block 
was supposed to be laid”, tells Z, a member of the Balai Citoyen and a researcher at the 
Université de Ouagadougou.    
  However, what Z mentions above do indicate an issue which I want to highlight. The 
dependency on new ICTs (and hence their networks and electricity on which they rely) for 
staying connected during crucial moments – i.e. in a protest on the streets – and for getting 
information, social media can also backlash. Morozov (2011) highlights how Facebook can 
actually help authoritarian regimes to carry out their repression by increasing surveillance 
while providing means to promote a pro-regime stance. In Burkina I came across these types 
of actions too, although carried out by the leading political party in the polls, the MPP. I 
spoke to some of their communication officers often and they told me that they too used 
Facebook to influence the online debates. O explains how the MPP followed the online 
debates since well before the uprising, and especially during the period of transition, when the 
political campaigns were in full swing. He states that his job was to “keep a watchful eye on 
the online discussions and make sure that the MPP was visible everywhere. We knew that we 
would get negative PR also, but that also meant that we were visible. As long as our name 
was the biggest, we knew we would win. Moreover, you should know that I am not the only 
one that is active online for the MPP….. We have a lot of young people, like me, who follow 
and join in the debates day and night. We gave them a tablet and some credit for Internet, and 
all they have to do is pop-up our name. Of course, we expect them to be at least a bit positive 
about us, but you know, it already helps”. In the course of the months, I regularly visited O at 
his office to ask how things were going with the campaign. And, as he already predicted, his 
approach worked. Step by step, day by day, the MPP started to grow in his likes on Facebook, 
his followers on Twitter and the amount of people that commented on their posts.  
  I found the above mentioned job description of O and the other youngsters keeping ‘a 
watchful eye’ on the online debates a bit worrisome since they deliberately steered the online 
debates towards their party. Meaning that the ‘open and free’ virtual spaces from which many 
got their daily dose of news, and on which some based their opinions on the political context, 
were hacked or fed with, sometimes, deliberate ‘non’- information. It is up to the user to see 
what he or she does with information derived from a source that is sometimes untraceable. 
But fact is that many individuals and collectives took on information from Facebook as the 
‘truth’, without checking the source, which of course, also influenced the offline debate.    
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Source: campaign material of the MPP in a street in Ouagadougou. Image by Getty Images.  
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Conclusion : « Ensemble on n’est jamais seul » 
Concluding arguments 
From the above description of events and analysis, I will answer the research question: How 
and why did new ICTs influence the growth, outcome and aftermath of Burkina Faso’s recent 
uprisings?  
  A few conclusions can be drawn how new ICTs played a role in the growth, outcome 
and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings. It is important to state that, indeed, new ICTs, 
among which Facebook, played a critical role in the mass mobilisation in both of the 
Burkinabè uprisings. However, we cannot see the events and the influence of ICTs therein 
outside of the political context in which they occurred. I argue that new ICTs were critical in 
the sharing of information and being a place where likeminded people could find each other. 
Moreover, they were an accelerator of communication and mobilisation. Sharing information 
about tactics, place and time was faster and more efficient. They provided the means for 
organising protests and demonstrations at a rapid pace and they changed the opportunities for 
mobilisation, making it less necessary to establish structured organisations with an established 
or underlying ideology, such as trade unions, to get people on the streets. For those 
movements that do not have many (financial) resources for organisation, such as the Balai 
Citoyen, new ICTs were vital for the spread of their message and the success they gained in 
making their collective voice be heard, as well as to attach people to their movement.  
  Although new ICTs and the radio (with SMS and in-call discussions) were important 
in raising awareness, creating a momentum of individual and collective political action, 
opening up spaces for discussion and information sharing, and rapid mobilisation at times that 
there was an urge, I argue that the uprising of October 2014 would have happened eventually, 
with or without ICTs. Nevertheless, those that were fed up – social movements, opposition 
parties, and individuals – had the means to use new ICTs as a tool for sharing ideas (and 
grievances) and organising protest, it happened faster and maybe more efficient. New ICTs 
brought with them the “push” (C, journalist), that was needed to really put pressure on 
everyone to continue. “One day of strike was not enough, two days of strikes were not 
enough, a week of barricades were not enough. No matter what happened, we would not back 
down. It was all or nothing”, recalls R, a member of the Balai Citoyen. One could argue that 
after the first days of demonstrations in October 2014 people would have gotten the hang of it, 
and ICTs were not necessary anymore to give this push. But, as described above, the 
visualization of the amount of people that were on the streets, and sharing these photos and 
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videos on Facebook, made people to take up their broom, spatula, or protest signs as well. 
There was a sense of urgency behind this protests which ensured that, after the numerous 
other demonstrations against the regime Compaoré, this one would not dim out.  
   Why new ICTs played a role in the uprisings have three dimensions. First, new ICTs 
played a role in the growth because they offered a platform for information sharing and the 
sharing of collective beliefs, grievances and ideas, that traditional media – i.e. not interactive 
– could not offer, not in the least because much of it was state-owned, leading to feelings of 
mistrust of where information comes from. Nevertheless, this mistrust in where information 
comes from did not fully seem to bother those that massively shared information when it was 
time to contest the status quo. Secondly, new ICTs played a role in the outcome of the 
uprisings because it ensured a long-during push and ensured a sharing of a collective 
grievance; the necessity to oust Blaise Compaoré. New ICTs ensured that people, even if they 
were not in the big cities, felt like they were part of the uprising. People could follow what 
was going on in real-time, as well as decide to head to the city, because they could ask, 
through mobile phones, radio or social media, how the course of the days would be organized 
and if it was worth it to travel. This resulted in a citizen-led popular uprising in “which 
everybody felt like they participated”, states Aziz.  
  Third, new ICTs play a role in the aftermath of the uprisings, because they still 
function as a space for political debate, even though the debate might have shifted towards 
new issues and these debates now have less urgency. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
when the necessity would come up again, new ICTs would be the first to pick up and share 
information. Moreover, we need to see this role of ICTs in its context.  
  The analysis of the hypotheses leads to an integral answer to the research question. 
First of all, following the above discussions on the Burkinabè uprisings, I argue that dynamics 
in political agency can explain why new ICTs played role in the growth, outcome and 
aftermath, because ICTs are a platform on which people can express and share their opinions, 
and meet those that share the same grievance, opinion, or idea. This, when there is a sense of 
urgency, might lead to the awakening or enforcing of political agency and the feeling of “we 
can do this too”. But, when the momentum is gone, or the sense of urgency is not felt, or 
change is not per se needed or wanted, this agency can also, for some, slow down or even feel 
defeated when expectations are not met – the aftermath.     
  Secondly, I argue that the use of memories of past political heroes in the collective 
actions frames of movements, shared both online and offline, played a role in the growth, 
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outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè uprisings. Images of Sankara and Zongo were shared 
well before the uprising of 2014 to create a sense of belonging and to create awareness on the 
wrong-doings of the regime Compaoré. Moreover, during the uprisings, images of Sankara 
were shown to showcase how ‘his sons’ were fighting his battles. Furthermore, in the 
aftermath of the uprisings, the cases of Zongo and Sankara are still used as a reference to urge 
the new regime to hurry up the process of seeking justice.  They live on throughout the 
uprisings – before, during and long after.  
 
 
Source: Protesters holding up a sign stating “Thomas Sankara, look at your sons, we are fighting your fight” – 
freely translated. Credit: AFP    
   
  Thirdly, I argue that the logic of connective action in the understanding of the social 
movements that challenge power relations through, amongst others, new (virtual) spaces, 
explains why new ICTs played a role in the growth, outcome and aftermath of the Burkinabè 
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uprisings. The logic of connective action within social movements can explain why ICTs 
were such a useful and successful tool for the fast creation of a collective identity, as well as 
ensuring rapid mobilization. However, this logic of fast connection, without ideological or 
structural organizational foundation also explains why many followers of these movements 
during the moments of ‘truth’ (the actual days on the streets), now feel left alone and lost to 
where they belong. 
  Lastly, I argue that existing power structures in communication play a role in how new 
ICTs were used and how they played a role in the growth, outcome and aftermath of the 
Burkinabè uprisings. The existing power structures in who can control information had an 
effect on the growth of the uprising because new ICTs opened up a new space for political 
debate and information. But, those who control information still have power in deciding when 
and how people can use the networks on which new ICTs depend. This can have a huge effect 
on if new ICTs can even be used for the spread of information. Moreover, the existing power 
structures in communication also relate to those that have to money to invest in media 
campaigns and communication teams. A party such as the MPP had the money, other 
resources and the contacts to dominate the public debate, both online and offline.  
  One could argue that both uprisings were successful in their outcome, meaning that 
those protesting achieved their goals of ousting Blaise Compaoré and stopping a coup d’état. 
However, the question remains if they ensured durable political change. I argue that we know 
too little on the role of ICTs in the aftermath of uprisings, after the big momentum has passed. 
The media attention dies out, things go back to normal and people try to pick up normal life. 
This means that some are also fed up with talking politics. E, a friend and journalist at 
Faso.net, recently told me that he though the Balai were “over-doing it”, and if we could for 
once “just not talk about politics”. The struggle for movements is to ensure that people stay 
with them, as well as that they can ensure credibility. New ICTs can play a role in this.   
 
« Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose » ?  
“Change requires both processes of interruption and continuity in order to advance newer 
modes of doing” (Paracharissi & Easton, 2013, p.12). At the time that I am finishing this 
thesis, the Burkinabè are celebrating their 2nd anniversary of the revolution. All over 
Facebook you see them share ‘memories’ through Facebook.53 In the course of October 2016, 
                                                          
53 In 2015 Facebook introduced a new feature in which it shows you posts from the same date on a different year 
on your wall, and then you can choose to ‘relive’ that Facebook memory by posting it on your wall again. So, the 
Burkinabè are posting many Facebook memories of October 31st 2014 on their walls on October 31st 2016.   
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six prominent citizen movements together formed the coalition: Ditanyè.54 Ditanyè is also the 
name of the national anthem of Burkina Faso, which also stems from the period of Sankara. 
They did so in order to sustain the watchdog function that many of these movements have 
played during the uprisings, the period of political transition and the elections. They formed 
the coalition to combine their strengths and foster collaboration. At their second press 
conference together (the first one was to launch the beginning of the alliance)on the 27th of 
October 2016, they announced that at the time of celebration for the two year anniversary of 
the revolution, the dream of changing the country had made place for deception. There was 
still no justice for the martyrs who had fallen, there was still no justice for Sankara, Zongo, 
Boukary and other heroes of the popular struggle, and the political system as they knew and 
know it has not changed much.  
  Yes, they collectively ousted their president who was way overdue. Yes, they have 
had elections that were rather fair. But: how much of this political system that they wanted to 
change has actually changed? As a conclusion to this thesis I want to state three things. The 
structural political change that might have been the end goal of the revolution for those that 
organised the socio-political movements may not have reached Burkina Faso yet. However, 
for structures to change you also need patience, and more than just knocking of the first head 
of the triple headed monster. Moreover, where the Burkinabè did succeed, is the rapid and 
effective mobilisation and spread of information and raising more awareness amongst those 
that were not interested before. Next to this, this changing political atmosphere did make sure 
that some things were put in motion. Already during the period of transition, interim-president 
Kafando opened up the case of Sankara’s death, and a bit further down the line, the case of 
Norbert Zongo was re-opened also. Nevertheless, the system that Kaboré and his MPP have 
put in place is, more or less, exactly the same as that of his predecessor, Comaporé. Many, 
especially young, Burkinabè feel misled and used by both the social movements as well as the 
opinion leaders on what was promised. Discussion on social media has made way for 
criticism towards the new regime, those in the opposition and the ones that stood on the 
streets with all those that feel defeated right now. However, the feeling of urgency – the need 
– is not felt, because there is no hook that can spark a new uprising, let alone that the 
Burkinabè would want a new uprising.  
                                                          
54 Within the coalition the following movements can be found: Le Balai Citoyen; Le Cadre Deux heures Pour 
Nous, Deux Heures Pour l’Afrique; La Génération Cheikh Anta Diop; La Génération Joseph Ki Zerbo; La Ligue 
des Panafricanistes; Le Mouvement Des Sans Voix Burkina; Le REPERE (Le Balai Citoyen, 2016).  
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  This analysis has shown that new ICTs cannot be put at the forefront in explaining the 
Burkinabè uprisings, let alone political change in general, since, it does not give a complete 
answer to why people hit the streets and why it had the outcome that it had. I argue for an 
integral approach to understanding uprisings, in which new ICTS – mobile phones, social 
media and the like – are included in the equation, just as much as the in societies already 
existing structures, such as social movements and power structures. And, most importantly, 
we need to understand better what happens – also on and with new ICTs – after uprisings of 
periods of political unrest in which new ICTs played a role. The Burkinabè uprisings and its 
aftermath of deception do not stand on their own. In our current times in which, especially, 
African governments tend to shut down the Internet and mobile networks during elections, or 
just in general, because they are afraid of public unrest and demonstrations (Ethiopia, Chad, 
the Gambia, Congo DRC, to name a few), further research needs to address the issues of why 
new ICTs are important and how and why they play a role in political change, even more so in 
regimes that are highly repressive, such as Chad an Ethiopia.  
 
Source: Picture of Roch Kaboré, the new president of Burkina Faso, at the 2nd anniversary of the insurrection at 
the (burned-down) National Assembly. The text on the banner reads: “2nd year of the popular uprising in Burkina 
Faso. Victory to the people that rose up on the 30th and 31st of October 2014. Picture from the public Twitter 
profile of @Dieuson1. 
  Two years after the popular uprisings, I am in Ouagadougou and I get invited to go to 
a panel discussion organised by the Coalition Ditanyè, in which, amongst others Michel 
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Kafando the president of the transitional government, discussed what was left of the 
‘insurrection populaire’, two years after. What followed was a ‘debate’ (the panellists talked 
mostly) of 4.5 hours, which concluded in: “Even if we are not happy with the current state of 
affairs of the government, even if we have not yet had justice for Sankara and Zongo, what we 
do have is an everlasting spirit of revolution. This flame will never die, as won’t the spirit of 
the popular uprising. We are proud people, and will stay vigilant and alert – la patrie ou la 
mort nous vaincrons!” After these words, everybody returned home on their motos or went 
for a round of political debates with Brakina’s in a maquis. Not so much had changed in these 
two years, other than that the Burkinabè were now confident in that if they would – 
collectively – not agree with their regime, they could overthrow it again – together.   
      
 
Source: Public mobile phones charging place on the market in Tenkodogo, Burkina Faso. Picture taken by F. 
Dragstra, April 30, 2015.   
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Annex A: Information about my informants 
A  A member of the CNT, and leader of the movement Ça suffit! 
Aziz  A young social entrepreneur, goes where the job takes him 
B  Researcher at Université de Ouagadougou, member of CADRE 
BB  Political analyst at Radio Oméga 
Basic Soul Member of the Balai Citoyen  
C    Journalist, and a member of the Balai Citoyen 
CE   Activist and freelancer 
D  Founder of Deux heures pour nous, duex heures pour l’Afrique 
E   Journalist at Faso.net  
F   Teacher, and a member of the Balai Citoyen 
H  Owner of his own ICT4D Company 
HD  Businessman, member of CADRE 
I   Economist, researcher at the Université de Ouagadougou 
K   Social media manager at Faso.net 
L  Coordinator at Semfilms 
M   Political analyst, member of the movement REPÈRE and a councillor at CNT 
N  Journalist 
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O Coordinator of communication at the MPP 
P   Journalist at Faso.net 
R   Host of debates, freelance trainer, a member of the Balai Citoyen 
S   Political analyst and journalist at Sidwaya 
SC Activist and highly involved in formal and informal political discussions   
T   Politician, member of the MPP 
V   A car dealer and businessman 
VA   Slammer, math teacher, member of the Balai Citoyen 
Y   Freelance journalist, worked for Burkina24.com   
Z   Researcher at Université de Ouagadougou, a member of the Balai Citoyen 
